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Lawyer advertising has been and will undoubtedly continue to be a
subject of considerable debate and controversy both within and outside
the legal profession.' Although lawyer advertisements were upheld as
deserving first amendment protection by the United States Supreme Court
in Bates v. Arizona,2 and then expanded and defined in four subsequent
advertising decisions, 3 considerable restraint still attaches to the lawyer's
* J.D., University of Kansas, 1981; Ph.D., Kansas State University, 1980. Assistant Pro-
fessor, Texas A&M University, Department of Management-Business, Public policy, and the
Law Group.
** Ph.D., Louisiana State University, 1982. Assistant Professor of Marketing, Texas
A&M University.
*** Ph.D., Louisiana State University, 1983. Assistant Professor of Marketing, Texas
Christian University.
1. For example, Supreme Court Justice Warren E. Burger is quoted by The National
Law Journal as stating before an ABA commission on advertising "that many lawyers who
advertise are engaging in 'shysterism,' that were he still in private practice he would 'dig ditches'
before he would advertise, and that the public should be advised to 'never, never, never under
any circumstances' hire a lawyer who advertises." Terror, Legal Ads Top ABA Meeting, The
National Law Journal, July 22, 1985, at 3, 18. In the same article, ABA president William
W. Falsgraf is quoted as stating "I don't think lawyers should be brought up for ridicule
if they exercise a First Amendment right that a majority of the Supreme Court says they have.
[Advertising, particularly for legal clinics,] lets the public know what the ballpark is as to legal
rates." Id.
2. Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) See infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
3. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assoc., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985). See infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
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right to advertise.' Although most state bar associations now allow
lawyers to advertise,' those advertisements considered permissible usually
are limited to "routine legal services," and subjected to restrictions on
the information that may be conveyed and on the medium employed.6
The legal profession, now relatively comfortable with some limited forms
of advertising by its members,7 still harbors major concerns about the
potentially adverse effects unrestricted advertising would have on the
profession in general.8 Of particular concern is the potential use or misuse
by lawyers of direct mail advertising and advertisements employing the
electronic media, neither of which has been the subject of direct scrutiny
by the Supreme Court.9
The principle concern of this article is lawyer direct mail adver-
tisements.10 In assessing the permissibility and acceptability of direct mail
as a means through which the legal profession may communicate with
prospective clients, this article examines the current regulatory environ-
ment, the economics, and consumer and lawyer perceptions regarding
the use of direct mail advertisements. After a brief discussion of the early
4. A number of the constraints imposed by the states have been based on broad inter-
pretations of the decision of the Court in Ohralik. See, e.g., State of Kansas v. Moses, 231
Kan. 242, 642 P.2d 1004 (1981). See infra notes 86- 90 and accompanying text (for a discussion
of the Ohralik decision).
5. By 1980, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia had amended their disciplinary
rules in order to comply with Bates; only Hawaii and Montana had not. ANDREWS, BIRTH
OF A SALESMEN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, at 43 (1980).
6. See Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment, AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 967, 986-1020 (1981); Martineau, The Supreme Court and State Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 199 (1981); Welch, Bates, Ohralik, Primus-The First
Amendment Challenge to State Regulation of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30 BAYLOR
L. R. 585, 600-04 (1978).
7. See infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text (discussing the results of a survey in-
dicating that 80% of the profession answered in the affirmative to the question, "should lawyers
be allowed to advertise under certain circumstances?").
8. For example, a Florida judge stated that with the Bates decision, the practice of law
left "the era of professionalism." Florida Bar v. Schrieber, 420 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1982) (opinion
of Judge Ehrlich). See also supra note I (statement of Chief Justice Burger).
9. The Court has denied certiorari in three previous direct mail advertisement cases. Eaton
v. Supreme Court, 270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981);
In re Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927 (1980), 872 cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981);
Greene v. Grievance Committee, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 140, 429 N.E.2d 390 (1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1738 (1982). However, in its next term, the Court will have the opportunity to
consider a New York direct mail advertising case, In re Von Weigen, 101 App. Div.2d 627,
474 N.Y.S. 147, modified, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838 (1984); and an Iowa case involving
television advertisements, Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State
Bar Assoc. v. Humprey, 355 N.W.2d 565 (1984). In the Bates decision the Court did note
that advertisements on "electronic media warrant special consideration." 433 U.S. at 384.
10. "Direct Mail Advertising" involves the use of the mails to send advertisements to the
homes and businesses of prospective clients. See American Medical Association v. Federal Trade
Commission, 537 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 1744 (1982). See also Comment,
Attorney Direct Mail Communication: The Koffler Commercial Speech Approach, 4 W. NEw
ENGLAND L. REv. 397, 399 n.18 (1982).
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history of lawyer advertising, the current regulatory environment con-
trolling the use of direct mail advertisements will be examined. With no
Supreme Court decision directly scrutinizing lawyer direct mail adver-
tisements, and in light of the other lawyer advertising decisions of the
Court," numerous important questions remain unanswered regarding
the regulatory environment surrounding direct mail advertisements.
Although some of these questions have been or are being considered by
state courts' 2 considerable divergence exists in the regulatory constraints
states currently impose on lawyer communications with potential clients
through the mails.' 3
Next, the economic arguments for the abolition of prohibitions on
lawyer advertising will be considered and developed. The Court in Bates
noted the importance of the economic effects of advertising prohibitions,
stating that "advertising.. .performs an indispensible role in the alloca-
tion of resources in a free enterprise system ...." and that advertising
restrictions "inhibit the free flow of commercial information,
[thereby]...keep[ing] the public in ignorance.'"I Economic theory and
supporting empirical evidence suggest that the consequences of the
elimination of such restrictions would be reduced prices and increased
competition, at least for routine legal services.
Despite the benefits flowing from the elimination of restrictions,
however, some members of the profession remain opposed to lawyer
direct mail advertising. Much of that opposition is grounded in beliefs
about consumer perceptions and attitudes regarding lawyer direct mail
advertising, and about the effect such advertising will have on profes-
sional credibility. In assessing the validity of those beliefs, this article
will present the results of two surveys comparing and contrasting con-
sumer and lawyer attitudes regarding direct mail advertising. The results
indicate that lawyers and their consumers differ significantly in their
attitudes toward and perceptions of direct mail advertising.
11. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 119-74 and accompanying text. See also Comment, supra note 10; Note,
Advertising By Attorneys and the First Amendment, 46 ALB. L. REV. 250 (1981); Comment,
The First Amendment, In re R.M.J., and State Regulation of Direct Mail Lawyer Advertising,
34 BAYLOR L. REV. 411 (1982); Note, Direct-Mail Solicitation By Attorneys: Bates to R.M.J.,
33 SYRACUSE L. REv.999 (1982).
13. Compare, e.g., the statute of Maine, ME. BAR R. 3.9(a) (specifically including direct
mail as a permissible means of "public communication") with those of Massachusetts, MASS.
DR 2-103 (explicitly proscribing direct mail advertisements), Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 7-125
app. DR 2-101(B) (Supp. 1979) ("[a] lawyer may publish . . . information, subject to DR
2-103, in print media regularly published"), and Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. tit. 9 app. DR 2-101(B)
(Supp. 1982) ("[a] lawyer may publish [certain advertisements], subject to DR 2-103, in newspapers
and periodicals of general circulation, distrilbuted in the geographic area or areas in which the
lawyer resides, maintains offices or in which a significant part of his clientele resides").
14. Bates, supra note 2, at 364.
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EARLY HISTORY OF LAWYER ADVERTISING
A. Early Regulation of Lawyer Advertising'5
In the early history of the United States Bar, lawyer advertising was
not formally prohibited. Arguably, no need for formal prohibitions
existed since "by common practice, by the high traditions of the profes-
sion, there was no lawyer advertising.'"26 Although accounts of the actual
origin of these informal no-advertising rules vary,'7 the prohibitions
against such "unprofessional" solicitations were probably derived from
a similar set of common practice rules then in existence in England.I
The general rationale for the prohibitions grew out of the notion that
since most lawyers were general practioners in small communities and
most litigation was between family members, neighbors, close business
associates, or other persons involved in such intimate associations,
solicitations were thought to "stir up litigation" and adversely affect
those relationships.' 9
Despite these early customs of practice, however, advertising became
a common practice in the legal profession around the time of the Civil
War, and continued through the early part of this century.2" During that
period, advertising came under increasing state scrutiny, with prohibi-
tions on advertising implemented in the latter part of the period, no doubt
in response to pressure from powerful members of the profession itself.'
15. For a detailed analysis of the history of legal advertising, see Christensen, Advertising
By Lawyers, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 619. See also Note, Attorney Solicitation of Clients, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 755 (1979).
16. Jeffers, Institute on Advertising Within The Legal profession-Con, 29 OKLA. L. REV.
620, 620 (1976).
17. Some commentators assert that soliciation restrictions date to Roman times. See, e.g.,
ANDREWS, supra note 5.
18. See In re Cohn, 10 11. 2d 186, 201, 139 N.E.2d 301, 305 (1957). Drinker contends
that students of the law in early English society were from wealthy families. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS, 210-11, n.3 (1953). They perceived themselves as professionals serving the interest of
the public. Id. To advertise for pecuniary gain was perceived as contradicting that image. See
also Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L.
REv. 674 (1958).
19. DRINKER, supra note 18, at 23.
20. Jeffers, supra note 16, at 620.
21. In reviewing the history of regulation, a number of economists have convincingly argued
that instead of being thrust on business, regulation is often being procured by the regulated
businesses. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoNoncs AND MANAGE-
MENT SCIENCE 6 (1971). The government is viewed as a supplier of such "regulatory services"
as price fixing, restriction on entry, and subsidies. Id. In this regard, government regulation
can be a less costly means for businesses to gain control over the market. Id. This view of
regulation seems to have some merit. As Judge Posner has observed:
The railroads supported the enactment of the first Interstate Commerce Act, which
was designed to prevent railroads from price discrimination, because discrimination
was undermining the railroad's cartel. American Telephone and Telegraph pressed
for state regulation of telephone service because it wanted to end competition among
1202
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Assertedly, the prohibitions were "an attempt to prevent certain social
evils.... In particular, advertising of divorce services was forbidden on
the grounds that such ads would encourage dissolution of marriage and
the breakdown of the family." 22
However, prohibitions on advertising and the imposition of codes of
professional ethics during that period were not unique to the legal pro-
fession; virtually all the professions imposed similar prohibitions on adver-
tising.23 With a few exceptions, the rationale for those prohibitions dif-
fered little from profession to profession. 2 To illustrate, the general ra-
tionale for the prohibitions on advertising in the dental profession were
set forth explicitly in a 1935 Supreme Court case, Semler v. Oregon Board
of Dental Examiners.25 The state court observed that:
[I]t could not be doubted that practitioners who were not willing
to abide by the ethics of their profession often resorted to such adver-
tising methods "to lure the credulous and ignorant members of the
public to their offices for the purpose of fleecing them"....
We do not doubt the authority of the state to estimate the baleful
effects of such methods and to put a stop to them. The legislature was
not dealing with traders in commodities, but with the vital interests of
public health, and with a profession treating bodily ills and demanding
different standards of conduct from those which are traditional in the
competition of the market place. The community is concerned with the
maintenance of professional standards which will insure not only com-
petency in individual practitioners, but protection against those who
telephone companies. Truckers and airlines supported extension of common carrier
regulation to their industries because they considered unregulated competition excessive.
Posner, Theories of Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 335 (1974).
22. ANDREWS, supra note 5.
23. See generally Bloom, Advertising in the Professions: The Critical Issues, J. OF
MARKETING, 103, 103-10 (July 1977); TRUMAN, THE DocToR-HIs CAREER, His BUSINESS, HIS
HUMAN RELATIONS, at 82-83, 117, and 136-46 (1957); BLASINGAME, DIGEST OF OFFICIAL ACTIONS
OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 669-75 (1939); HOLLINSHEAD, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS
OF THE AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, SURVEY OF DENTISTRY (1958); Barclay, Trade or Pro-
fession?, J. AM. MED. AsSOC. 756 (Feb. 16, 1976); Darling, Attitudes Toward Advertising By
Accountants, J. OF ACCT., 48-53 (Feb. 1977); Sprague, The Advertising Dilemma, CPA J.,
27-30 (January 1977); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 702 (1972).
24. See Darling, supra note 23, at 50 (reporting the results of a broad survey of accoun-
tants, lawyers, dentists, and physicians). According to Professor Darling:
The various professional groups in the U.S. have long banned advertising on several
grounds. On the one hand, the professionals feel the public must be protected against
fraudulent and unscrupulous promoters. In addition, it is felt that participation in
advertising activities would lower the prestige of professionals in the public eye. Those
favoring bans on advertising also maintain that such solicitation is an expense which
must be covered, one that would not necessarily lower fees and would convey little
information about the quality of service.
Id., at 28-29.
25. Semler v. Oregon Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1935).
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would prey upon a public peculiarly susceptible to imposition through
alluring promises of physical relief. And the community is concerned
in providing safeguards not only against deception, but against prac-
tices which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its
members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities
of the least scrupulous. What is generally called the "ethics" of the
profession is but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity
of such standards.
It is no answer to say, as regards appellant's claim of right to adver-
tise his "professional superiority" or his "performance of professional
services in a superior manner," that he is telling the truth. "'
Similarly, the rationale for the prohibitions on advertising in the legal
profession have centered on the negative effects advertising would have
on the profession and the general public." One rationale was that adver-
tising would undermine the dignity of the profession as well as clients'
confidence in lawyers and the legal system.28 Another rationale asserted
that potential clients knew the reputations of local, neighborhood lawyers
and thus did not need advertising to make an informed, reasoned choice. 9
Due to the wide variance in content and quality of individual legal needs,
many have asserted that any advertising would be misleading. The pro-
position was based on the assumption that members of the public are
generally uninformed as to their actual legal needs, and thus do not know
how to evaluate legal service advertisements adequately. 0 In that regard,
many were concerned that the general public would be susceptible to
misleading or deceptive advertisements-assuming, without supporting
evidence, that consumers were simply not sophisticated enough to avoid
26. Id.
27. See generally Note, Advertising, Solicitation, and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal
CounselAvailable, 81 YALE L. J. 1181, 1181-85 (1972); Bradway, Publicity for lawyers, 8 FED.
B. J. 55-59 (1946).
28. Historically, bar associations have argued that the forms of advertising necessary to
most other commercial enterprises would lesson the dignity of the legal profession. See Brandt
and Waugh, Recent Developments in Attorneys' Fees, 29 VAND. L. REv. 698, 698 (1976).
29. In general support of this contention, studies have established that consumers rely heavily
on personal information sources when selecting a lawyer. See, e.g., Ladinsky, The Traffic in
Legal Services: Lawyer-Seeking Behavior and the Channeling of Clients, in Brickman and
Lempert, eds., The Role of Research in the Delivery of Legal Services, Washington, D.C.:
The Research Center for Consumers of Legal Services, RANN Report, NSF/Ra-760089, at
61 (May 1976). In light of the prohibitions on advertising, however, prospective clients would
expectedly utilize personal contacts which in the absence of advertising, would be the most
effective means of gathering information on the price, quality, and availability of legal services.
Id.
30. In a particularly extreme argument, one commentator has asserted that lawyer adver-
tising might lead to "the domination of a society by the rich who would hire the best lawyers."
Wynn, Lawyer Advertising: Birth of a Salesmen or Death of a Profession, 66 MAss. L. REv.
159, 159 (1981) (message of Thomas J. Wynn, President of the Massachusetts Bar Association).
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being taken in by half-truths, omissions of important information, and
other deceptive advertising. 3' Considerable criticism of the liberalization
of advertisingrules was directed at the potential for "stirring up litiga-
tion," 32 and for increasing costs.33 Finally, it was contended that adver-
tisement of a certain service for a fixed price would encourage a lawyer
to provide the advertised service whether or not the service actually fit
the client's particular needs. The hypothetical asserted in support of this
latter contention was of a lawyer tempted to "cut corners" when con-
fronted with a client who is attracted by an advertisement stating a fix-
ed fee for the resolution of a certain legal problem but who actually has
a more complicated legal problem than that for which the fixed fee was
advertised. In extending the hypothetical, the lawyer might induce the
client to purchase more expensive legal assistance, thereby making himself
vulnerable to accusations of "bait and switch" advertising.3"
B. The Canons of Professional Ethics of the ABA and the
Formalization of Advertising Prohibitions
In 190811 the American Bar Association codified ethical standards and
created the Canons of Professional Ethics.36 With exceptions made for
certain communications with friends, relatives, and clients, and for listings
in telephone directories, lawyer advertising was banned as an unaccep-
31. A Harris poll taken in the late 1970's found that 46% of the more than 1,500 in-
dividuals polled, believed that all or most television advertisements were seriously misleading.
Business, Public Out of Sync, 23 ADVERTISING AGE 102 (1977). Another study directed at television
advertising by lawyers found that such advertising had a negative impact on the image of lawyers:
[Riespondents felt that lawyers who advertise only on TV do not provide high quality
service, do not represent themselves well, have not been in business a long time,
are not trustworthy, are not well respected by other lawyers, and do not have a
professional attitude.
Traylor and Mathias, The Impact of TV Advertising Versus Word of Mouth on the Image
of Lawyers: A Projective Experiment, 12 J. ADVERTISING 42 (1983). However, consumers must
be moved in some way by such advertisements since commercial enterprises would not adver-
tise in that manner if, in fact, the advertisements were not effective.
32. See Christensen, supra note 27, at 142-46.
33. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
34. In general support of the anecdote, consumers often do not realize they have a prob-
lem that legal assistance could help resolve. See Morrison, Institute on Advertising Within the
Legal Profession-Pro, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 609, 610 (1976). A study by the American Bar Foun-
dation found that over 26076 of the research respondents never considered consulting a lawyer.
CURRAN AND SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC, at 69 (1974).
35. The first code of professional ethics in the United States was adopted by the Alabama
Bar Association in 1887. See DRINKER, supra note 18, at 23.
36. Canon 27 provided that "solicitation of business by circular or advertisements, or by
personal communications, or interviews, not warranted by personal relationships, is unprofes-
sional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any
kind." DRINKER, supra note 18 at 215. The principal motivation of the ABA in adding the
Canon was a fear of a growth in commercialization throughout the country. Id., at 25. Note
that Canon 27 drew a distinction between so called direct and indirect forms of advertising
1205
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table form of solicitation.37 According to the Canons, "The most worthy
and effective advertisement possible.. .is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. ' 3
Subsequently, most states adopted the ABA Canons or something similar,
all prohibiting lawyer advertising.
Between the 1908 Canons and the first major revision in 1969, ethics
committees undoubtedly spent more time on the question of legal services
advertising than on any other subject.3 9 In Texas alone, more than eighty
percent of the opinions on professionalism and ethics were related to
the subjects of advertising and solicitation. 0 After determining that the
old ABA Canons of Professional Ethics needed extensive revision, a
Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards began in 1965
the task of preparing the new code. The Canons were replaced in 1970
by the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (code).4 Disciplinary
Rule 2-101(A) of the Code provided:
A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be prepared, use, or participate
in the use of, any form of public communication that contains profes-
sionally self-laudatory statements calculated to attract lay clients; as
used herein, "public communication" includes, but is not limited to,
communication by means of television, radio, motion picture,
newspaper, magazine, or book.4 2
by lawyers. See Note, State Statute Barring Solicitation of Legal Work Held to Violate Due
Process as Applied to NAACP, 63 COLUm. L. REV. 1502, 1504-07 (1963). Direct advertising
consisted of "soliciting" professional employment "by circulars, advertisements, through touters
or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relation," while in-
direct advertising generally included the seeking of publicity and most forms of self-laudation.
See In re Connelly, 18 A.D. 2d 466 (1963).
37. ABA CANON 27. In addition to Canon 27, there were six other Canons related to
lawyer advertising, although not as specifically stated. Canon 28 was concerned with "stirring
up litigation, directly or through agents;" seeking to prevent deception, Canon 33 set forth
rules for the selection and use of firm names; subject to certain limitations on individual ad-
vice; Canon 40 allowed lawyers to write legal articles and to be identified by name; Canon
43 put limitations on law name lists; Canon 45 permitted certain legal specialists; Canon 46
allowed the announcement of certain associations between lawyers or between firms.
38. ABA CANON 27. Brosnahan and Andrews argue that reputation alone was considered
sufficient "advertising" due to the historically parochial nature of legal practice. Brosnahan
and Andrews, Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: In the Public Interest?, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV.
423 (1980). For a general discussion of the parameters of permissible conduct under these early
restraints imposed by the ABA, see Comment, Bar Restrictions on Dissemination of Informa-
tion About Legal Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 483, 488 (1974).
39. Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral
Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 244, 255-56 (1968).
40. Smith, The Texas Canons of Ethics Revisited, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 183, 192-93 (1966).
41. See generally Sutton, The American Bar Association, Code of Professional Respon-
sibility: An Introduction, 48 TEXAs L. REv. 255 (1970); Note, supra note 27.
42. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-101 (A) (1970).
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THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT AFFECTING DIRECT ADVERTISEMENTS
A. The Supreme Court and Advertising as Protected Speech
The economics of prohibitions on advertising and other such solicita-
tions arguably provided sufficient incentive for their continued existence,
regardless of whether that was in the public interest.4 3 Public ratifica-
tion of the prohibitions, however, was provided by the legal system which
rationalized their existence as necessary to the protection of the profes-
sion and the general public." Early decisions by the Court established
the "commercial speech doctrine," which held advertising to be unde-
serving of first amendment protection. For example, in Valentine v.
Christensen, the Court upheld a ban on street distribution of advertis-
ing notices, observing that "the Constitution imposes no.. .restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising. 45 In effect, adver-
tising that was inspired primarily by economic-"purely commercial"-as
opposed to political motives, could be regulated and/or prohibited. 4"
Part of the motivation of the Court in developing this doctrine was to
protect credulous consumers against unscrupulous advertising tactics.
The court was apparently assuming that the general public lacked ade-
quate sophistication to make judgments in its own interest regarding
advertised claims.
1. The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech
In the mid-seventies, the Court first explicitly recognized the negative
effects on consumers from prohibitions on advertising and other forms
of commercial communications by the professions, imposed through their
state governments. In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court first noted that some
commercial information is important to the efficient exchange of
resources in a free market, and consequently should be afforded first
amendment protection. 47 The Court reasoned, "[the] relationship of
speech to the marketplace of products or services does not make it
valueless in the marketplace of ideas." ' 48 In Bigelow, the Court ques-
43. An economist would argue that such rules are generally implemented to restrict com-
petition, allowing for higher prices than would prevail in the absence of such restrictions. See
infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text. See also FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVER-
SARY SYSTEM, 114-15 (1975); Schuchman, supra note 39 at 259.
44. See, e.g., supra note 26 and accompanying text.
45. Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
46. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. U.S., 383 U.S. 463 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
47. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
48. Id. at 826.
1207
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tioned the validity of Valentine, explaining that the Valentine decision
related only to "a reasonable regulation of the manner in which com-
mercial speech could be distributed," 49 and not the content.
A year later in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., the Court held that the right of society to com-
mercial information was superior to the strong interest of the state of
Virginia in upholding a high level of professionalism among pharmicistsY°
The Court noted that even a speaker delivering a "purely economic"
message is eligible for some degree of first amendment protection.3I Con-
centrating on the economic benefits to consumers, the Court stated that
consumers have a keen interest in receiving commercial information with
which to make informed economic decisions."2 In a similar vein, the Court
noted that the freedom to advertise played an essential role in a free
market by promoting competition. 3 Nevertheless, the Court, in a care-
fully worded footnote, attempted to tailor the decision to the facts of
the case. The Court specifically mentioned that advertising may be prob-
lematic in both the legal and medical professions, since neither dispense
"standardized products." 4
After Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the analysis by the Court of com-
mercial speech has become considerably more structured. In 1980, the
Court enunciated a test for evaluating commercial speech in Central Hud-
son and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission." In that case, the
New York Public Service Commission had ordered the cessation of all
promotional advertising by electric utilities, except informational adver-
tisements designed to reduce consumption during peak usage periods.
In invalidating the regulation, the Court enunciated a four-pronged test
for evaluating such restrictions:
49. Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
50. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765-73 (1976).
51. Id. at 761-63.
52. Id. at 757, 763-64.
53. Id. at 764-65.
54. See id. at 773 n. 25. According to the Court:
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial advertis-
ing by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other professions, the
distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may require considera-
tions of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense
standardized products; they render professional services of an almost infinite variety
and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception
if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising.
Id.
55. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
1208
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(1) Does the speech concern lawful activity and is it not misleading;
(2) Has the state advanced a substantial interest in the regulation;
(3) Does the state's regulation directly promote that interest;
(4) Does the state's regulation exceed the bounds of necessity to
serve such interest.56
Although subject to some criticism," the Central Hudson four-part test
is still the state-of-the-art in the legal analysis of commercial speech."8
2. The Supreme Court and Lawyer Advertising
Prior to 1977, state prohibitions on lawyer advertising were rarely ques-
tioned by members of the profession, its clients, or the federal govern-
ment. Indeed, as the cases prior to Bigelow illustrate, the Supreme Court
viewed regulation of commercial speech as tantamount to the regula-
tion of a business activity, that is, wholly permissible and without the
protection of the first amendment. 9
In the mid-seventies, however, in response to the position of the Court
regarding commercial speech and the imposition of prohibitions and
restrictions on publicly disseminated information by the professions, a
number of significant changes occurred in the manner in which other
organizations and the federal government viewed such prohibitions and
restrictions. For example, the Federal Trade Commission took action
to remove prohibitions placed on advertising by the professional organiza-
tions for doctors,60 pharmacists,6' and opthamologists, optometrists, and
opticians.62 The antitrust division of the Justice Department filed suits
against the American Pharmaceutical Association 63 and the American
Bar Association 61 to force them to allow advertising among their
members. In addition, the professions came under close scrutiny in the
popular press regarding their advertising prohibitions.65 Perhaps
56. Id. at 566.
57. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1981).
58. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929, 937- 38 (1982).
59. See generally supra note 45 and accompanying text.
60. In re American Medical Association, BNA ATRR No. 744, at AA-I (Dec. 23, 1975).
61. Trade Regulation Rule to Prohibit State Bans on Price Advertising of Prescription
Drugs, BNA ATRR No. 716, at A-2 (June 3, 1975).
62. Trade Regulation Rule To Remove State Bans on Price Advertising of Eyeglasses, BNA
ATRR No. 745, at A-8 and E-I (Jan. 6, 1976).
63. U.S. v. American Pharmaceutical Association, No. G75- 558-CA5 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
64. U.S. v. American Bar Association, No. Civ. 76-1182 (D.C. 1976).
65. See Legal Profession Is Considering Code Amendments to Permit Restricted Advertis-
ing by Lawyers, 62 A.B.A. J. 53-4 (Jan. 1976); Code Amendments Broaden Information Lawyers
May Provide in Law Directories, and Yellow Pages, 62 A.B.A. J. 309-10 (March 1976); House
Broadens Code's "Publicity In General" Rules at Midyear Meeting in Philadelphia, 62 A.B.A.
J. 470-72 (Apr. 1976).
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motivated by all this activity, the American Bar Association voted in
1976 to liberalize the nature of information lawyers could include in direc-
tories, yellow page telephone listings and general lists of lawyers." With
the recognition of commercial free speech by the Supreme Court in the
mid- seventies, the right was quickly considered for application to lawyers
and lawyer advertising.
(a). Bates v. Arizona.
Just one short year after Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the right of
commercial free speech with regard to lawyer advertising was first con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in Bates v. State of Arizona.6 The Court
held that lawyer advertising was a form of commercial speech, protected
by the first amendment, and as a consequence the states could no longer
absolutely prohibit advertising by the legal professional.
6 8
In Bates, the appellants had been disciplined for placing an advertise-
ment for their legal clinic in a newspaper. 69 The advertisement included
information regarding fees charged for various routine legal matters, in-
cluding uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions, simple personal
bankruptcies, and name changes. 0 Borrowing heavily from the decision
of Virginia Board of Pharmacy,7' the Court reasoned that the "[s]tate
may [not] prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful
66. See, e.g., FTC Claims Ban on Doctors' Advertising Violates Anti-trust Laws, Stabilizes
Fees, Wall Street Journal, - (Dec. 23, 1975); When Two Lawyers Ran Afoul of Advertis-
ing Rules, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 62 (Jan. 26, 1976); Closing in on the Professions,
BusiNEss WEEK, 106 (Oct. 27, 1975); Doctors' Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, 63-4 (Jan. 5, 1976); Clamor
Grows, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 61 (Jan. 26, 1976).
67. Bates, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Bates decision has generated a considerable amount
of literature on lawyer advertising. See infra note 235 and accompanying text. See also Note,
The Traditional Ban on Advertising by Attorneys and the Expanding Scope of the First Amend-
ment, 38 LA. L. REv. 259 (1977); Note, The First Amendment Protects Attorneys' Rights to
Advertise Fixed Prices for Routine Legal Services, 9 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 295 (1978); Com-
ment, Lawyer Advertising: The Practical Effects of Bates, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 349 (1978);
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 H~Aiv. L. REv. 1, 198-208 (1977).
68. The Court relied exclusively on the appellants first amendment arguments. See Bates,
433 U.S. at 384. The Court rejected the appellant's claim that the prohibition on lawyer adver-
tising by the state of Arizona was a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The
Court ruled that state regulation of the profession falls within the "state action" exception
to the Act. Id., at 359-64. The appellants claim had been based on earlier Supreme Court
decisions involving restraints on the legal profession. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n,
421 U.S. 773 (1975). See generally Note, Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar Restraints on Advertis-
ing and Solicitation by Attorneys, 62 VA. L. REV. 1135 (1976); Martineau, The Supreme Court
and State Regulation of the Legal Profession, 8 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 199 (1981).
69. Bates, 433 U.S. at 353-56.
70. A copy of the advertisement appears in the appendix to the Bates opinion. Id. at 385.
71. The Court explained:"We have set out this detailed summary of the Pharmacy opin-
ion because the conclusion that Arizona's disciplinary rule is violative of the First Amendment
might be said to flow a fortiori from it."Id at 365.
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advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal ser-
vices." ' 72 In addition, the Court rejected the state interests advanced in
support of the continuation of the prohibition on lawyer advertising.73
In particular, the Court noted that the effect of the advertising ban of
the state bar was "to inhibit the free flow of commercial information
and to keep the public in ignorance. ' 7 According to the Court:
The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the
free flow of commercial speech may often be far keener than his con-
cern for urgent political dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests
are served by such speech. Advertising, though entirely commercial,
may often carry information of import to significant issues of the
day .... And commercial speech serves to inform the public of availabili-
ty, nature, and prices of products and services and thus performs an
indispensible role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise
system .... In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests
in assuring informed and reliable decision making. 75
The Court, however, did limit the Bates holding in two important
respects. First, as noted above, the Court did place emphasis on "adver-
tisement[s] concerning the availability and terms of routine legal ser-
vices." ' 76 Secondly, the Court emphasized that states were not to be con-
sidered precluded from regulating in the area of lawyer advertising. The
decision specifically stated that the Court did not "hold that attorneys
may not be regulated in any way." ' 77 The Court then went on to recom-
mend some specific instances in which state regulation would be per-
missible. The Court first mentioned "[a]dvertising that is false, decep-
tive, or misleading.... 7 With specific regard to the legal profession,
the Court mentioned that the bounds of truthfulness may vary from one
profession to another, depending upon the sophistication of the particular
audience:
[B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services,
misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other
advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising. For
72. Id. at 384.
73. Id. at 379. In Bates, the respondents asserted that lawyer advertising would have "an
adverse effect on professionalism," id. at 368; that such advertisements were of a "misleading
nature," id. at 372; would adversely "affect the administration of justice," id. at 375; would
have "undesirable economic effects," id. at 377; would adversely affect the "quality of ser-
vice," id. at 378; and would pose "difficulties in enforcement." id. at 379. According to the
Court: "[We] are not persuaded that any of the proferred justifications rise to the level of
an acceptable reason for the suppression of all advertising by attorneys."Id.
74. Id. at 365.
75. Id. at 364.
76. Id. at 353-4.
77. Id. at 383.
78. Id.
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example, advertising claims as to the quality of services-a matter we
do not address today-are not susceptible of measurement or verifica-
tion; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading as to
warrant restriction.79
The Court pointed out that similar state restrictions could be placed
upon in-person solicitation"0 and illegal advertisements, 8' and that the
advertisements on "electronic broadcast media [would] warrant special
consideration." 82 In addition, the Court noted that states could im-
pose reasonable restrictions on the "time, place, and manner of adver-
tising. "" Thus, the Court left many boundaries to be determined by
the states as they set about attempting to interpret the Bates deci-
sion. Significantly, the Court said nothing about direct mail
advertisements.
The Bates decision, however, did not completely dispel the interest
of the state in regulating commercial speech by lawyers. In the immediate
wake of the Bates decision, states attempted to construe the case as
narrowly as possible. 4 To accomplish that goal, Codes of Profes-
sional Responsibility were rewritten to preserve as much of the old
traditions as could be constitutionally rationalized.
(b). Lawyer Advertising in the Wake of Bates
In the year following Bates, the Court was faced with two cases on
the same day pertaining to lawyer solicitations.8 While both cases
challenged state disciplinary rules prohibiting solicitation on first amend-
ment grounds, they are difficult to compare in that they come from op-
posite ends of the solicitation spectrum.
In Qhralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,16 the Court was confronted
79. Id. at 383-4.
80. Id. at 384.
81. Id. (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973)).
82. Id. An important television advertising case that could serve to further define those
special considerations was recently decided in Iowa. See Committee on Professional Ethics and
Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565 (1984) (upholding
an Iowa Bar Association rule prohibiting television advertisements that contain background
sound, visual displays, more than a single nondramatic voice, or self-laudatory statements).
83. Id.
84. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
85. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978). See Comment, Attorney Solicitation: The Scope of State Regulation After Primus
and Ohralik, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 144 (1978); Note, Solicitation By Attorneys: A Prediction
and a Recommendation, 16 Hous. L. REV. 452 (1979); Comment, Commercial Speech and
The Limit of Legal Advertising, 58 OR. L. REV. 193 (1979); Note, Lawyer Solicitation: The
Effect of Ohralik and Primus, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 960 (1979); Note, Benign Solicitation
of Clients by Attorneys, 54 WASH. L. REV. 671 (1979); Welch, Bates, Ohralik, Primus-The
First Amendment Challenge to State Regulation of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30
BAYLOR L. REV. 585 (1978).
86. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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with a case involving a lawyer who had solicited clients while they were
still hospitalized.87 The Ohio court had found the in-person solicitation
a violation of the code of professional ethics of the Ohio state bar. The
Court clearly differentiated between in-person solicitations and adver-
tisements as information sources:
[I]n-person solicitation serves much the same function as the adver-
tisement in Bates. But there are significant differences as well. Unlike
a public advertisement, which simply provides information and leaves
the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation exerts
pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing
an opportunity for comparison or reflection. The aim and effect of
in-person solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presentation to
encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed decision making. There is
no opportunity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of
the bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited in-
dividual .... In-person solicitation is as likely as not to discourage per-
sons needing counsel from engaging in a critical comparison of the
"availability, nature, and prices of legal services;" it actually may
disserve the individual and societal interest identified in Bates, in
facilitating "informed and reliable decision making." [footnotes
omitted]"8
The Court held that the state may constitutionally discipline a lawyer
who solicits clients in-person "for pecuniary gain, under circumstances
likely to pose dangers that the state has the right to prevent." 89 The
Ohralik decision has maintained importance as states have attempted
to define the reaches of the Bates holding. States have used the Ohralik
decision to defend a variety of prohibitions on lawyer advertising.90
87. Ohralik involved a lawyer who had obtained contingent fee agreements from two young
women who had been injured in an automobile accident. Id. at 449-54. The lawyer had made
an in-person solicitation, visiting one victim in the hospital and the other at her home on the
day of her release from the hospital. Id. From the former woman he received a signed contingent-
fee agreement, while the other agreed orally to such an arrangement. Id. Although both later
attempted to discharge the lawyer, he still succeeded in getting a share of the insurance recovery
of the women who had been driving the automobile-but only after suing her for breach of
contract. Id. Both women filed complaints against the lawyer with the Greviance Committee
of the Geauga County Bar Association. Id. The lawyer was suspended for violating the Ohio
state code rules against in-person solicitation. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the suspen-
sion. Id.
88. Id. at 457-58.
89. Id. at 449. According to the Court (citing the brief for the Appellant):
[Tihe state has a legitimate and indeed "compelling" interest in preventing those
aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching,
and other forms of "vexatious conduct."
Id. at 462. But see Pulaski, In-Person Solicitation and the First Amendment: Was Ohralik
Wrongly Decided, 1979 ARIz. ST. L. J. 23 (for a contrary view of the Ohralik case).
90. See State of Kansas v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1981) (regard to a pro-
hibition on direct mail advertising upheld on the basis of Ohralik).
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The second case, In re Primus,9' concerned a lawyer for the American
Civil Liberties Union who wrote a letter to a woman inquiring whether
she desired free legal representation offered by the ACLU. The
Disciplinary Board of the South Carolina Supreme Court found that the
letter constituted solicitation in violation of the Disciplinary Rules of
the state. 92 The Supreme Court, seeing a clear distinction between this
case and Ohralik, reversed. The Court noted that the letter imparted "in-
formation material to making an informed decision" and "was not
facially misleading." 93 In contrast with in-person solicitation, the Court
found that the letter did not involve an "appreciable invasion of privacy,"
and did not provide an "opportunity for overreaching or coercion." 94
With regard to the form of communication involved the Court noted:
[T]he fact that there was a written communication lessens substan-
tially the difficulty of policing solicitation practices that do offend valid
rules of professional conduct. 95
Perhaps the most important fact in the case, although not noted explicitly
by the Court, was that the solicitation was not intended to result in direct
pecuniary gain for the lawyer involved. The Court ruled that the letter
did constitute solicitation, but nevertheless was entitled to first amend-
ment protection as a form of political and associational speech. 96 As a
consequence, the state was required to "regulate with significantly greater
precision."97
Despite the decisions of Bates, Ohralik, and Primus, several impor-
tant questions regarding lawyer advertising remained open. Clearly,
however, the focus of the ongoing debate over lawyer advertising had
shifted as a consequence of those decisions, from whether advertising
91. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In Primus, a lawyer-Edna Smith Primus, practic-
ing in a "community law firm" and also in an association with the ACLU as an officer and
as a cooperating lawyer-was invited to give an address to some women who had been sterilized
as a condition for the continued receipt of medical assistance under the Medicaid program.
Id. at 414. At the meeting, Primus advised those attending of their legal rights and suggested
the possibility of a lawsuit. Id. Mary Etta Williams, who had been sterilized by Dr. Clovis
H. Pierce, was in attendence at the meeting. Id. Later, after being advised that Williams wanted
to bring suit against Pierce, Primus sent Williams a letter informing her of the ACLU's offer
of free legal representation. Id. at 414-21. Although Williams elected not to pursue legal action,
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South
Carolina determined that the letter constituted a solicitation for the ACLU in violation of the
disciplinary rules. Id. The Supreme Court of South Carolina agreed. Id.
92. Id. at 414-21.
93. Id. at 435.
94. Id. at 436.
95. Id. at 436.
96. Id. at 422. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (association for the pur-
poses of legal representation declared to be a basic first amendment right that may not be
curtailed in the absence of a compelling state interest).
97. Primus, 436 U.S. at 438.
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should be allowed in any form, to how and to what extent lawyer adver-
tising should be regulated. With regard to the extent of regulatory con-
trol, the issue of first amendment protection for direct mail communica-
tions and electronic media advertisements for the purpose of gaining
clientele had not been addressed in any meaningful way.98 In Central
Hudson,9" decided in 1980, the Court did resolve the question of the ap-
propriate standard of review for the reach of regulations imposed on
advertising.100 The Court denied certiorari, however, in three cases in-
volving lawyer direct mail advertising with prospective clients for
pecuniary gain, thereby avoiding the opportunity to clarify that issue.10'
(c). Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Lawyer Advertising
In 1982, the Court, in light of Central Hudson, took the opportunity
to scrutinize regulations on lawyer advertising in In re R.M.J. Some
believed that the disposition of R.M.J.by the Court would resolve the
direct mail issue. 0 3 The case involved a lawyer who had advertised the
opening of his new firm in several newspapers and in the yellow pages,
and had mailed professional announcement cards to a selected list of
addresses. The lawyer was found to be in violation of the Missouri Code
of Professional Responsibility and was issued a private reprimand. The
Missouri Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the adver-
tising restrictions of the state, did not apply the Central Hudson test.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision.
In reaching that decision, the Court emphasized the Bates holding that
lawyer advertising was a form of commercial speech, protected by the
first amendment, and that advertising by lawyers may not be subjected
to blanket suppression. The Court found that the information publish-
ed by the lawyer was not misleading and that the state presented no
substantial interest in need of protection."' In an attempt to clarify the
98. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 10, at 399-400 (absence of a Supreme Court decision
providing specific guidelines in the area of direct mail communictions has placed the resolution
of this issue upon the states).
99. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
100. See Canby, Commercial Speech of Lawyers: The Court's Unsteady Course, 46 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 401, 403 (1979).
101. Eaton v. Supreme Court, 270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
966 (1981); In re Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026
(1981); Greene v. Grievance Committee, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 140, 429 N.E.2d 390 (1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1738 (1982).
102. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
103. See, e.g., Note, High Court to Rule on Lawyer Ad Controls, 67 A.B.A. J. 1108,
1108 (1981).
104. See R.M.J.. 455 U.S. at 206.
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extent to which states may regulate lawyer advertising, the Court divid-
ed lawyer advertising into three basic categories:
[1.1 [Rlegulation-and imposition of discipline-are permissible
where the particular advertising is inherently likely to deceive or where
the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising
has in fact been deceptive.
[2.] Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the
States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of poten-
tially misleading information, e.g., a list of areas of practice, if the in-
formation also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.
[3.] Even when a communication is not misleading, the State re-
tains some authority to regulate. But the State must assert a substan-
tial interest and the interference with speech must be in proportion to
the interest served .... Restrictions must be narrowly drawn, and the State
lawfully may regulate only to the extent regulation furthers the State's
substantial interest.10'
Although the Court did not explicitly apply this categorization to direct
mail advertisements, the Court did address the issue of whether such
advertising could be subject to a blanket suppression:
Mailings and handbills may be more difficult to supervise than
newspapers .... There is no indication that an inability to supervise is
the reason the State restricts the potential audience of announcement
cards. Nor is it clear that an absolute prohibition is the only solution.
For example, by requiring a filing with the Advisory Committee of a
copy of all general mailings, the State may be able to exercise reasonable
supervision over such mailings.' 0 6
In an accompanying footnote the Court stated further that to avoid
"frightening" a public unaccustomed to receiving letters from law offices,
the lawyer could be required to stamp "This is an Advertisement" on
the envelope.'07 However, despite the offerings on the subject in R.M.J.,
numerous concerns regarding the permissible limits of direct mail adver-
tisement regulation remain.
In a more recent case, Zauderer v. Office of the Disciplinary Counsel
of the Supreme Court of Ohio,' the Court struck down restrictions on
lawyer advertising that prohibited advertisements from targeting a specific
group. In this case, an attorney placed newspaper advertisements, first
offering to defend drunk drivers, and later, offering to represent women
105. Id. at 202-03.
106. Id. at 206,
107. Id. at 206 n.20.
108. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 105 S.
Ct. 2265 (1985). See Less Dignity, More Hustle, TIME, at 66-67 (June 10, 1985).
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who had suffered injuries resulting from their use of the Dalkon Shield
Intrauterine Device. The former advertisement provided that the client's
"full legal fee [would be] refunded if [he were] convicted of drunk
driving," while the latter advertisement included a line drawing of the
device in question. ,09 The Ohio Supreme Court, upholding the Board
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, found the advertisements
to be false and deceptive principally because they did not include
statements sufficiently qualifying the claims being made.
The Court found that to resolve the appeal, three separate regulations
imposed by Ohio needed consideration:
(1) prohibitions on soliciting legal business through advertisements
containing specific legal problems;
(2) restrictions on the use of illusirations in advertising by lawyers;
and,
(3) disclosure requirements relating to the terms of contingent
fees.' 0
In considering the validity of the lawyer advertising regulations of the
state, the Court stated that "[ain attorney may not be disciplined for
soliciting legal business and advice through printed advertisements con-
taining truthful and nondeceptive information and advice regarding the
legal rights of potential clients. ""' The Court found that the adver-
tisements constituted commercial speech, were not false, and the state
could not demonstrate that the regulations advanced a substantial govern-
ment interest." With regard to the use of illustrations, the Court noted:
The use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves impor-
tant communicative functions: it attracts the attention of the audience
to the advertiser's message, and it may also serve to import informa-
tion directly. Accordingly, commercial illustrations are entitled to the
First Amendment protection afforded verbal commercial speech." 3
As to the disclosure requirements, the Court found that the state had
"attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial adver-
tising. " " 4 The Court, however, did state that unjustified or unduly
burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the first amendment
rights by chilling protected commercial speech." 5
109. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2271.
110. Id. at 2272.
111. Id. at 2281.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2280.
114. Id. at 2282.
115. Id. The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court to discipline Zauderer was based, in part,
on his failure to include a disclaimer setting forth the fact that clients might be liable for
substantial litigation costs even if their lawsuits were unsuccessful. Id. at 2283.
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(d). The Supreme Court and the Unanswered Questions
Regarding Direct Mail Advertisements.
As the foregoing cases illustrate, the Supreme Court has encouraged
the use of advertising by the legal profession. As commercial speech,
lawyer advertising has the same first amendment protection provided
other commercial speech. The Supreme Court, however, has set aside
as a special category, advertising that is misleading or that experience
has proven to be inherently misleading. Commercial speech in this
category can be appropriately regulated and restricted by the states. Aside
from this exception, lawyer advertising can be regulated only if the state
can first demonstrate a compelling interest. Any such restriction, however,
must be narrowly drawn, and the state can regulate only to the extent
that the regulation furthers substantial state interests. Finally, commer-
cial speech challenges to advertising regulations are to be reviewed under
the Central Hudson four-prong test." 6
The Court has recognized that direct mail advertisements may be more
difficult to supervise than other forms of lawyer advertising."1 Since the
states have means to undertake such supervision, "'8 however, direct mail
advertisements cannot be subject to a blanket suppression. Clearly state
regulations based on general assertions regarding enforcement difficulties
or overcommercialization will not withstand scrutiny. Numerous ques-
tions, however, remain about the extent to which direct mail adver-
tisements may be regulated.
First, at what point will a direct mail advertisement constitute an im-
pernissable solicitation? May lawyers using such an advertisement discuss
their practice generally, or must the advertisement contain information
specific to the legal problem of the respondent, thereby providing the
respondent with information useful in reaching an "informed and reliable
decision" with regard to legal services? Second, may proper state regula-
tions be concerned with the response of the recipient? For example, may
states regulate with the intent of protecting those recipients who poten-
tially may receive such an advertisement after a death in the family, during
a time of marital discord or deep indebtedness, or after involvement in
a police matter? Third, should direct mail advertisements generally be
prohibited in those situations in which they raise the potential for con-
flicts of interest? For example, suppose the letter is intended to provide
information to one party who is then expected to act as an indirect solicitor
116. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
117. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206.
118. Id. at 206 n.20.
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for the lawyer in presenting that information to a third party with whom
the lawyer potentially may be in conflict? Finally, to what extent should
lawyers be allowed to get a list of prospective clients from third parties
(doctors, insurance agents, etc.) for the purpose of mailing that person
an advertisement?
B. State Decisions on Lawyer Direct Mail Advertisements
With no Supreme Court decisions dealing directly with the subject of
direct mail advertising, and thus with no specific guidelines in the area, 19
the resolution of the issue has been placed upon the states. In their efforts
to resolve the issue, however, no clear majority position on the use of
direct mail advertisements by lawyers to communicate with prospective
clients has developed. Significant differences exist among the states in
the case and statutory law on the subject. 2 '
1. Decisions Favoring Direct Mail Advertisements
The first major post-Bates state decision upholding lawyer direct
mail advertising was Kentucky Bar Association v. Stuart.121 In Stuart,
two lawyers had been reprimanded for mailing letters to several real
estate brokers; the letters stated their fees for certain routine legal
matters regarding real estate transactions. 122 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky held that the letters were "a form of advertise-
ment" and, therefore, were protected by the first amendment. '23 The
court was not persuaded that the letters induced the "evils" associated
with in-person advertising such as over-reaching and deceptive prac-
tices by unscrupulous lawyers. 4 The court also rejected the conten-
tion of the state that direct mail advertisements posed problems in
the enforcement of ethical standards because such letters are not open
to scrutiny:'25
[T]his very case demonstrates that enforcement of ethical standards will
not be impossible or overly difficult because it is allowed to take the
form of a letter. Ample protection may be assured the public by pro-
mulgation of a rule which requires the attorney to mail a copy of such
119. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in three cases involving direct mail adver-
tisements. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 13.
121. Kentucky Bar Association v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978).
122. Id. at 933.
123. Id. at 934.
124. Jd.
125. Id.
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advertisements to the association simultaneously with the mailing of
one or more of them to members of the public.'26
In In re Koffler,1'" the New York Court of Appeals reversed a lower
court, holding that "[d]irect mail solicitation of potential clients by
lawyers is constitutionally protected commercial speech which may be
regulated but not proscribed."' 28 Koffler had mailed over 7,500 letters
to individual real property owners and real estate brokers offering to
perform real estate closings for a stated fee. Although the lower court
had held that the direct mail campaign constituted impermissible solicita-
tion,'2 9 the court found only semantic differences between advertising
and the direct mail "solicitations" in which Koffler had engaged. 30 The
court concluded that direct mall advertising could not be subject to pro-
phylactic regulation by the state.' 3' In considering the arguments against
direct mail advertising, the court stated:
Invasion of privacy and the possibility of overbearing persuasion.. .are
not sufficiently possible in mail solicitation to justify banning it. As
the Supreme Court put it.. .a recipient of a lawyer's letter "may escape
exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring ... [it] from
envelope to wastebasket." It is not enough to justify a ban that in some
situations (marital discord, a death in the family) a solicitation letter
may be offensive to the recipient, or that some people may fear receiv-
ing a lawyer's letter, or to suggest that there may be some who by reason
of frequent receipt of lawyers' solicitation letters may discard without
opening a mailed summons. [footnotes ommitted]'"
Relying heavily upon the Stuart and Koffler decisions, a federal district
court struck down an Iowa disciplinary rule prohibiting direct mail adver-
tising. 33 In Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, a lawyer
challenged several rules imposed by the state of Iowa that limited lawyer
advertising.' Although the majority of the rules were found to be con-
stitutional, the court held that the rule banning direct mail advertising
126. Id. See also Foley v. Alabama State Bar Association, 481 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ala.
1979) (upholding a disciplinary rule requiring lawyers to file publicly copies of their direct mail
advertisements).
127. In re Koffler, 70 A.D.2d 252, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560 (2d Dep't 1979), rev"d sub nom.,
Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1980).
The case has generated a significant degree of comment. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 10;
Comment, Recent Developments: Advertising, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 119, 119-22 (1980);
Note, supra note 12.
128. Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, at 143, 412 N.E.2d 927, at 929 (1980).
129. In re Koffler, 70 A.D.2d 252, at 272, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560, at 573 (1979).
130. Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d at 146, 412 N.E.2d at 931 (1980).
131. Id. at 143, 412 N.E.2d at 929.
132. Id.
133. Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
134. Id. at 1233 (the challenged rules are presented in the appendix to the opinion).
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violated first amendment rights."' Emphasizing the importance to both
consumers and lawyers of the free flow of commercial information in
making informed decisions, the court rejected the interests advanced by
the state-the increased potential for conflict of interest, over-
commercialization, deceptive practices, and invasion of privacy.' 3 6
The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the use of direct mail adver-
tising in In re Appert.'17 Appert was charged with violating a Minnesota
rule proscribing direct mail solicitation after he mailed 250 copies of a
brochure warning of the dangers associated with "Dalkon Shield" intra-
uterine devices.' The court held that the rule amounted to an unconstitu-
tional restriction on lawyers' right of free speech and the public's right
to receive commercial information.'
39
2. Decisions Opposing Direct Mail Advertisements
In the 1978 case of Allison v. State Bar Ass'n, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana found little difference between lawyer direct mail advertising
and in-person solicitation, holding that the state may prohibit such
activity. 40 In Allison, two lawyers had mailed information to local com-
panies discussing their prepaid group services plan.' 4' In ruling against
the practice, the court placed special emphasis on the enforcement dif-
ficulties associated with such private communications.' 42
135. Id. at 1232. Only four of fourteen rules were found to be unconstitutional:
(1) Characterizations of the attorney's rates or fees by verifiable truthful use of
restrained adjectives such as "reasonable," "very reasonable," and "moderate."
(2) Identification by words of race.
(3) Advertising in publications other than newspapers and periodicals of general
circulation.
(4) Direct mailing of permissible advertising material.
Id. at 1232.
136. Id. at 1231-32.
137. In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981).
138. Id. at 205-07.
139. Id. at 209. The court also dealt with the assertion that the situation in the case was
different from that in Bates in that the instant case involved "complex litigation," which has
a greater potential for "abuse by lawyers not qualified to pursue such litigation." Id. The
court rejected the assertion, stating:
A careful consideration of this justification reveals that it is not sufficient to tip
the balance of interests in the Board's favor. Even if it can be assumed that there
is greater potential for abuse when complex cases are solicited, there are alternative
forms of regulation that can be imposed that would be less restrictive of the attorney's
right to advertise and the public's right to receive commercial information. That alter-
native is to require lawyers who advertise for cases requiring some specialization to
be certified in the area of specialization.
Id.
140. Allison v. State Bar Ass'n, 362 So.2d 489 (La. 1978).
141. Id. at 489.
142. Id. at 496.
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In Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania also rejected direct mail advertising."'4 In Epstein,
the lawyers in a new law firm wrote letters to their former clients asking
if they would like to be represented by the new firm. 44 The clients were
cleints of law firms with which the lawyers previously had been associated.
Stating that direct mail advertising could be proscribed,' 41 the court held
that the conduct of the lawyers in this case constituted impermissible
solicitation. 16
In Eaton v. Supreme Court of Arkansas, the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas ruled against direct mail advertising.'4 7 In Eaton, a lawyer arranged
to participate in a mass mailing sent to approximately 10,000 residents."
His advertisement was included in a packet along with other adver-
tisements and discount offers. Although the court did consider the com-
munication an advertisement, the Court ruled that the advertisement was
not protected commercial speech. The Court reasoned that the presence
of the advertisement alongside the other offers in the packet was likely
to be misunderstood as a discount offer, and therefore, the advertise-
ment was misleading. "9 In addition, the court noted that the advertise-
ment appeared to be "merely a lure to get customers into the advertiser's
place of business." 1 0
In The Florida Bar v. Schrieber,'"' the Supreme Court of Florida,
noting that "there is no controlling law concerning the present prob-
lem," ' 52 ruled that the actions of a lawyer who had sent a letter to a
single business recommending himself for employment, constituted illegal
solicitation.' 53 Applying Ohralik, the court concluded that the actions
of the lawyer were primarily designed to attract business and not to pro-
vide information on the accessability of the courts. Noting the same in-
formation could have been communicated to the public in other ways,
the court stated that the social benefit from direct mail advertisements
was "extremely marginal particularly when cast against possible harms
143. Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978).
144. Id. at 1177-78.
145. Id. at 1179-80.
146. But see Advertising Referendum, 43 Tax. B. J. 324 (1980) (decision of the Court in
Epstein frustrated goal of informed decision-making by clients).
147. Eaton v. Supreme Court of Arkansas, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980).
148. Id. at 56.
149. Id. at 59.
150. Id. at 60.
151. The Florida Bar Association v. Schreiber, 407 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1981).
152. Id. at 598.
153. Id.
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to the recipient."' 54 As in Allison, the court also noted the difficulties
in policing direct mail advertisements. 5 '
In State of Kansas v. Moses,', the Supreme Court of Kansas con-
victed a lawyer of "direct mail solicitation of a stranger for employment
of a particular legal matter."' 57 Essentially, the court reasoned that since
direct mail advertisements are actually solicitations and not advertising,
direct mail advertisements can be prohibited.'II Moses had sent approx-
imatly 150 persons selling homes a letter stating that he could provide
services in that regard for a set fee. According to the court:
The solicitation in the instant case, while not being of the nature of
ambulance chasing and hospital room solicitation, nevertheless is
directed to a segment of the public which, under present economic con-
ditions, is extremely vulnerable to a suggestion of employment that may
not be advantageous to the individual homeowner .... We believe that
the prohibitions and restrictions [on direct mail advertisements] are
reasonable and necessary for the protection of the public.'59
Despite the Koffler ruling recognizing the right of a lawyer to utilize
direct mail advertisements, the New York Court of Appeals has upheld
bans on such advertisements in at least three cases. 6 In Greene v.
Grievance Committee, Inc., an attorney had mailed flyers to real estate
brokers asking to be recommended to their clients. ' 6 ' Although the flyers
were in fact truthful and not misleading, the court, citing Ohralik, held
that such a situation constituted an "indirect" in-person solicitation, 
62
and raised the potential for a conflict of interest. 63 In considering the
extent of the prohibition, the court stated that "there was no adequate-
ly protective less restrictive alternative."
'
'
61
In In re Alessi, the New York Court of Appeals was faced with near-
ly the same fact situation as in Greene. In Alessi, two lawyers in a legal
154. Id. at 597.
155. Id. at 598-99.
156. State of Kansas v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1981).
157. Id. at 1007.
158. Id. at 1006.
159. Id. at 1007.
160. Greene, 429 N.E.2d 390 (1981); In re Alessi, 60 N.Y.2d 229, 457 N.E.2d 682 (1983);
In re Von Wiegen, 101 App. Div.2d 627, 474 N.Y.S.2d 147, modified, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470
N.E.2d 838 (1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1120.
161. Greene, 429 N.E.2d at 390-94.
162. Id. The court reasoned that the broker would recommend the lawyer to the client
in an in-person setting, thereby constituting in-person solicitation. Id. at 394.
163. Id. at 396. According to the court:
The possibility that the lawyer's view of marketability of title may be colored.
...The probability that the lawyer will not examine with the same degree of in-
dependence that he otherwise would . .. are examples of the conflict potential. ...
Id.
164. Id.
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clinic had sent a letter to approximately 1,000 real estate agents setting
forth fees for listed real estate transactions.65 The U.S. Supreme Court
had vacated the initial dismissal of the appeal and remanded the case
in light of the decision in In re R.M.J. '66 The court, however, upheld
the prohibition citing the Greene decision.' 67 The court reasoned that
in cases with the potential for conflicts of interest in attorney-client rela-
tionships, ample justification exists for a prohibition on direct mail adver-
tisements. 168
More recently, the Court of Appeals of New York considered the ques-
tion of direct mail advertising in In re Von Wiegen.'69 In Von Wiegen,
a lawyer had sent a letter to the victims of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency
Hotel skywalk collapse and their families. 17 Although the lower court
had concluded that direct mail advertisements directed toward accident
victims was similar to in-person solicitation and posed a significant threat
to the ability of the victims to reach a reasoned and informed decision
regarding their need for legal services, the Court of Appeals held that
a blanket prohibition on direct mail advertisements to accident victims
violated the lawyer's right of free expression under the first amendment. ' '
The court, however, did find that the letter contained deceptive statements
and, therefore, justified the sanctions imposed.' 7 The letter discussed
the formation of a "litigation coordination committee" to assist the Hyatt
Regency disaster victims, and stated that many victims had requested
representation by the lawyer.7 3 The statements regarding the commit-
tee were found to be misleading because the committee was comprised
of just the lawyer and his secretary. ' 7 The statement to the effect that
many victims were requesting his representation was found to be decep-
tive because some, not many, of the victims had contacted him and none
had requested representation. 171
3. Assessing the Permissibility of Direct Mail Advertising
The cases clearly indicate that direct mail advertising can be a per-
missible form of lawyer communication. In those cases in which the adver-
165. In re Alessi, 60 N.Y.2d 229, 457 N.E.2d 682 (1983).
166. In re Alessi, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983).
167. In re Alessi, 457 N.E.2d at 687.
168. Id.
169. In re Von Wiegen, 474 N.Y.S.2d 147, modified, 470 N.E.2d 838 (1984), cert. pending,
No. 84-1120.
170. Von Wiegen, 470 N.E.2d at 839.
171. Id. at 841.
172. Id. at 843.
173. Id. at 846.
174. Id. at 845.
175. Id.
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tisement has been rejected, (1) the lawyer overstepped the permissible
bounds with regard to truthful and informative advertising;' 7 6 (2) the
potential for a serious conflict of interest was present;'77 (3) an indirect
in-person solicitation would be involved; 17 or, (4) the advertisement used
tended to "entice not to inform."' The only case not receptive to such
categorization is Moses, a case involving what appears to be a blanket
prohibition of direct mail advertising on the rationale that direct mail
advertising is solicitation not dissimiliar from that in Ohralik.8 °
Clearly, direct mail advertising has become a popular method of lawyer
communication in the promotion of a lawyer's practice. As discussed
in the following section, the societal benefits of such advertisements war-
rant its authorization subject to proper restraints on the practices out-
lined above. Considerable differences in opinion exist, however, both
within the profession and between consumers and the profession as to
the acceptability of and the impact upon credibility from the use of direct
mail advertising.' 8'
THE EcoNomics OF LAWYER ADVERTISING
The subject of advertising and the effects of advertising on market
outcomes has received considerable attention in the economic
literature.' 82 In general, emphasis has been placed on advertising as
a means through which a seller differentiates his product from other
sellers. Other means of differentiation are location, better service, actual
physical differences in the product, and other nonprice differences
among products.' 83 Advertising is generally considered beneficial to
society when the advertisement is informative, ' facilitates production
176. See In re Von Wiegen, 101 App. Div.2d 627, 474 N.Y.S.2d 147; Eaton, 270 Ark.
573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980).
177. See Greene, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 429 N.E.2d 390 (1981).
178. Id.
179. See Epstein, 393 A2d 1175 (1978); Schreiber, 407 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1981); Eaton, 270
Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980). Shortly after the resolution of the Eaton decision, Eaton's
partner applied for admission to the Supreme Court Bar. In a strong dissent, Chief Justice
Burger discussed the Eaton decision, referring to the advertisement as "designed to entice, not
to inform," and concluded that Eaton's partner should be denied admission for having engaged
in "pure solicitation . . . wholly out of keeping with minimum proposed standards." In Re
Admission of Benton, 50 U.S.L.W. 3713, 3713-14 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1982) (C.J. Burger, dissenting).
180. Moses, 231 Kan. 242, 642 P.2d 1004 (1981).
181. See infra notes 231-52 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PEFORMANCE, ch.
15 (2d edition (1980)); GREER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, ch. 4 and 171-
77 (2d edition (1984)).
183. See generally BACKIAN, ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION, 23-27 (1967); SCHERER, supra
note 182, at 375-76.
184. See, e.g., Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
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scale economies,' 5 or motivates producers to maintain adequate quality
standards'86 because each facilitates competition in the marketplace.
Advertising is considered detrimental to society when the advertise-
ment serves to diminish competition by conferring monopoly power
upon those firms using advertising. 8 " Whether advertising will serve
to benefit or detriment society depends upon the economic circumstances
of the industry in question-such as market structure, 88 the nature
of the product,'89 and the regulatory environment. 9 °
213 (1961); Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOM.IY
311 (1970); Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 729 (1974).
Nelson argues that heavily advertised brands are informing the public that they are tile best
buys. Id. Businesses will advertise the most when their product is good enough that the pro-
duct will be repetitively purchased after the consumer has been induced to initially buy it through
advertising.
185. Production scale economies-the characteristic of being able to reduce costs at higher
levels of production-can be achieved if advertising increases consumer knowledge of the pro-
duct, thereby broadening market appeal and increasing sales. See Benham, The Effect of Adver-
tising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 JOURNAL OF LAW & ECoNOMICs 337 (1972) (in those states
where advertising was prohibited, thereby restricting high-volume, low-price retailers capable
of significant production economies, prices were 25 to 30% higher than in states without such
restrictions).
186. Trademarks and brand names allow consumers to reward producers with quality pro-
ducts through repeat purchases. See Goldman, Product Differentiation and Advertising: Some
Lessons from the Soviet Union, 68 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 346 (1960) (discussing how
in the Soviet Union manufacturers are required to put their production mark on consumer
products to guard against deterioration in quality).
187. Many commentators have argued that advertising may impose significant entry barriers
upon new firms entering the market. See, e.g., COMANOR & WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARIKET
POER, at ch. 4 (1974); Comanor & Wilson, Advertising and Competition: A Survey, 17 JOUR-
NAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 453 (1979). Those barriers are attributed to the cummulative
nature of past advertisements, economies of scale in advertising itself, and the fact that adver-
tisement outlay requirements increase the capital costs of new entrants beyond that required
for the purchase of plant and equipment. Id.
188. See generally COMANOR AND WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARKET POWER, supra note
187; Miller, Market Structure and Industrial Performance: Relation of Profit Rates to Concen-
tration, Advertising Intensity, and Diversity, 17 J. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICs 104 (1969); Comanor
& Wilson, Advertising, Market Structure, and Performance, 51 PEv. ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
423 (1969); Mann, Henning, & Meehan, Advertising and Concentration: an Empirical Investiga-
tion, 15 J. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 34 (1967); Tlser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POLITICAL
ECONOMY 540 (1964).
189. As a general rule, advertising by manufacturers raises prices and profits for the manufac-
turers as the advertising builds brand loyalties and market power; on the other hand, advertis-
ing by retailers lowers prices and profits for retailers because the advertising tends to be more
informative and procompetitive. See generally Nelson, The Economic Consequences of Adver-
tising, 48 J. BUstNEss 213 (1975); Porter, Consumer Behavior, Retailer Power, and Market
Performance in Consumer Goods Industries, 56 REV. ECONOMsICS AND STATISTICS 419 (1974);
Arterburn & Woodbury, Advertising, Price Competition, and Market Structure, SOurHERN ECON.
J. 763 (1981). The Court has noted that the impact of advertising will be effected by the pro-
duct being sold:
[E]conomic considerations suggest that advertising is a more significant force in the
marketing of inexpensive and frequently used goods and services with mass markets
than in the marketing of unique products or services.
Bates, 433 U.S., at 372 n.25.
190. See Benham, supra note 185; CADY, RESTRICTED ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION: THE
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The circumstances in the legal profession are such that extensive con-
trols have been exercised over legal services, the individuals selling those
services, and the type and amount of information public disseminated
regarding those services. 91 In contrast to the circumstances in most other
commercial activities, the mechanisms for control and choice are prin-
cipally the prerogative of the profession rather than of the consumer.' 9
Under similar circumstances, such control leads to decreases in competi-
tion and results in higher prices. 193 That is, the regulatory environment
of the legal profession is such that consumers are denied the benefit of
competition, competition that could be fostered by advertising. 19 Thus,
in contrast to the typical study undertaken regarding the economic effects
of advertising, the circumstances are such in the legal profession that
the concern is directed more toward the effects on market outcomes
resulting from those informlation constraints' 95 rather than on barriers
to entry erected by advertising outlays. 196 In fact, the Court in Bates noted
that the prohibition on the public dissemination of information imposed
by the profession erected a significant entry barrier, a situation con-
siderably different from the typical economic inquiry regarding the effects
of advertising:
In the absence of advertising, an attorney must rely on his contacts with
the community to generate a flow of business. In view of the time
necessary to develop such contacts, the ban [on advertising] in fact serves
to perpetuate the market position of established attorneys. Considera-
tion of entry-barrier problems would urge that advertising be allowed
so as to aid the new competitor in penetrating the market.' 97
A. Information and Advertising in a Competitive Market
The conventional idea of economic theory is perfect competition.
Based upon the fundamental belief that the consumer is sovereign-
that individual preferences are what count in the ledger of social
values'l-a perfectly competitive market will bring about the optimal
CASE OF RETAIL DRUGS (1976); Benham & Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A
Perspective on Information Control, 18 J. LAW & EcONomCS 421 (1975).
191. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
192. In contrast, in the competitive market, consumers are provided freedom of oppor-
tunity. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Benham, supra note 185.
194. See Cox, DeSerpa, & Canby, Consumer Information and the Pricing of Legal Ser-
vices, 30 J. INDUSTRIAL ECONomicS 305 (1982). See infra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Benham, supra note 185 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
197. Bates, 433 U.S. at 378.
198. See generally Scitovsky, On the Principle of Consumers' Sovereignty, 52 AMER. ECON.
REv. 756 (1973); ScITovsKY, THrE JOYLESS ECONOMY (1976).
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allocation of the scarce resources of society.' 9 9 That is, the market
leads to an allocation of resources that is efficient in the sense of
satisfying consumer wants with maximum effectiveness.200
A perfectly competitive market is generally defined by four main struc-
tural conditions: (1) many buyers and sellers; 20 ' (2) the product being
marketed is homogeneous;0 2 (3) an absence of patents, economies of
scale, and the like; 2 3 and (4) all participants have sufficient informa-
tion to make an informed decision about the product or service.20, This
latter condition is significant, particularly as the condition might relate
to buyers of legal services in a competitive marketplace.
This information requirement assumes that buyers possess considerable
knowledge about each of their many purchases. Furthermore, the re-
quirement implies that buyers:
(1) are readily able to appraise product quality objectively;
(2) have a well-defined set of purchase requirements;
(3) are aware of alternatives and the terms offered by other sellers;
and,
(4) are able to choose that combination of goods yielding the highest
possible benefit for any given level of expenditure.20 1
If all buyers met this description, sellers would find difficulty in selling
products and services consumers did not want, exaggerating the quality
of their product or service over another, or charging outrageous prices
199. In addition to the economist's efficient resource alloction argument for competitive
markets, Professor Scherer suggests there are important political arguments favoring competitive
markets:
(1) the requirement of numerous buyers and sellers in a competitive market decen-
tralizes and disperses power;
(2) the resource allocation issues are solved impersonally, not through the control
of businessmen or bureaucrats;
(3) competitive markets provide freedom of opportunity, in that since there are no
barriers to entry individuals are free to choose their preferred trade or profession.
SCHERER, supra note 182, at 12-13.
200. See GALBRAITH, TiE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE, 222- 23 (1968); REICH, THE GREENING
OF AMERICA, 110 (1971); Schwartzman, Competition and Efficiency, 81 J. POLITICAL EcoNolY
756 (1973) (for a more skeptical view).
201. Each buyer and seller must be so small relative to the total market that none of them
individually can affect product price by altering their volume of purchases if they are buyers,
or their level of production if they are sellers.
202. The product of any one seller must be a perfect substitute for the product of any
other seller.
203. Productive factors must be freely mobile into and out of markets. In addition, there
must be no barriers to entry of new firms.
204. This condition is often referred to, somewhat unrealistically, as requiring "perfect
knowledge." Perhaps more realistic is the requirement that buyers be aware of the price and
product offerings of sellers. Sellers, on the other hand, will be aware of product prices, wage
rates, material costs, and interest rates.
205. See generally Scitovsky, Some Consequences of the Habit of Judging Quality by Price,
12 REv. ECON. STUDIES 477 (1944-45).
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when alternatives are more cheaply available elsewhere.2"6 Unless the
market is centralized, however, most consumers will not know all the
prices for a particular good or service. In order to ascertain those prices
a consumer must investigate or "search" the market, collecting price
information in some orderly fashion. In any given market, the degree
of price dispersion will reflect the degree of consumer price ignorance.
According to Stigler, "[p]rice dispersion is a manifestation-indeed a
measure-of ignorance in the market.' '207 This consumer price ignorance
improves the profitability of seller exhortation, image building, func-
tionless style variation, rumors, and related gimmicks that play on the
subjective passions and preferences of such consumers." 8 In addition,
Stigler argues that consumers will undertake "the optimum amount of
search" ' 9 in order to determine the dispersion of price quotations by
sellers. The larger the dispersion of prices, the more advantageous in-
vestigating several sellers will be." 0 However, if public or private regula-
tions prohibit advertising, this search will become costly and difficult
to conduct, and consequently, the price dispersion among sellers will
necessarily increase. 1'
B. The Nature of Advertising
As the Court noted in Bates, "advertising is the traditional mechanism
in a free market economy for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser
206. As the text suggests, it would be impossible to artifically affect markets in the ways
suggested if the consumer actually possessed such information. However, note that sellers could
still differentiate themselves-and thus charge higher prices-if they could demonstrate that
their product was superior because of genuine, objective, nonprice differences among the pro-
ducts or services offered (involving quality, durability, service, convenient location, or the like).
207. Stigler, supra note 184, at 214.
208. In general, the typical consumer is relatively uninformed and therefore relatively un-
skilled at differentiating between differences in product quality from differences in seller exhor-
tation. See generally Cox, THE SORTING RULE MODEL OF THE CONSUMER PRODUCT EVALUATION
PROCESS, RISK AND INFORMATION HANDLING IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, 324-68 (1967); Bedian,
Consumer Perception of Price as an Indicator of Product Quality, MSU BUSINESS Topics, 59-65
(Summer 1971); Woodside, Relation of a Price To Perception of Quality of New Products,
J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY, 116-18 (Feb. 1972); Olshavsky & Miller, Consumer Expectations, Product
Performance, and Perceived Product Quality, J. OF MARKETING RESEARCH, 19-21 (Feb. 1972);
Cornell, Price as a Quality Signal, EcoNoMIc INQUIRY, 302-09 (April 1978). As a consequence,
in measuring product quality, consumers will tend to rely on such inaccurate signals as appearance,
touch, scent, sound, exaggerated advertising claims, and price. Id. With regard to services,
consumers tend to rely on reputation as established through the experiences of others, rumors,
and anecdotes, as well as on price and other advertising claims. Id.
209. Stigler, supra note 184, at 217.
210. Id. at 173.
211. This basic notion was noted by the Bates Court:
The ban on advertising serves to increase the difficulty of discovering the lowest cost
seller of acceptable ability. As a result, to this extent attorneys are isolated from
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of the availability and terms of exchange." ' That is, advertising is a
method for providing potential buyers with important market informa-
tion. Through advertising, the attributes, availability, and prices of a
good or service are thereby more widely and cheaply known. The greater
consumers are aware of alternatives, their availabilities, prices, and
characteristics, the less they are bound to any one seller. In that regard,
advertising will have a significant impact on the dispersion of prices, in
most instances bringing about a reduction in the costs of search for those
consumers wishing to obtain some product or service at the lowest possible
cost.
Although advertising can call attention to the availability of some pro-
duct and induce the consumer to try the product by making claims about
quality, profitability rests on subsequent, continued consumer
acceptance-at least for products that continue to be available for any
length of time under the same name. Sellers of inferior products will
be less able to retain customers, and will not survive long, for their firm
name will be worthless and their advertising will cease. In this regard,
information about goods or services is far more likely to provide com-
petitive forces in the marketplace.
C. Economic Evidence or the Effects of Advertising Prohibitions
Several authors have examined the relationship between restrictions
on advertising by the professions and the prices of the goods or services
provided. Benham compared retail prices of eyeglasses among states with
varying restrictions on eyeglass price advertisements." 3 He found that
advertising prohibitions significantly raised the average retail price of
eyeglasses relative to those states in which advertising was permitted.2t4
Cady conducted a similar study of drug advertising regulation and found
competition, and the incentive to price competitively is reduced.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 377.
212. Bates, 433 U.S. at 376.
213. Benham, supra note 185.
214. Id. Comparing the extreme cases of Washington, D.C., (which had virtually no restric-
tions) and North Carolina, (which had severe restrictions) it was estimated that the elimination
of all restrictions on advertising in North Carolina would reduce the average price paid for
eyeglasses by nearly nineteen dollars. Id. A similar study by the Federal Trade Commission
found that in those states where advertising for prices and services in optometry were restricted,
the average eye examination and pair of glasses cost $94.58 as compared with $71.91 in places
with no such restrictions. Interestingly, the study also found that in those areas where there
were no restrictions, the examination and glasses were $10 cheaper when purchased from a
optometrist who did advertise than from one that did not. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE
EFFECTS OF RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES IN THE PROFESSIONS:
THE CASE OF OPTOMETRY, (April 1980).
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that prescription prices were 5.2%o higher in states restricting
advertising. 2 5
Of particular interest in this article is a study conducted on legal ser-
vice pricing and advertising in the Phoenix, Arizona area.2"6 The study
reports the results of two surveys of lawyers in private practice conducted
in 1978, one involving an in-person interview and the other involving
a mail sample.2"7 With the exception of a question involving a plaintiff
personal injury claim, the survey questionnaire dealt with "routine legal
services," including:2 ' 8
(1) reciprocal simple wills for husband and wife;
(2) reciprocal simple wills with an educational trust provision;
(3) an uncontested nonbusiness bankruptcy for husband and wife;
and,
(4) an uncontested dissolution of marriage without a property settle-
ment agreement. 29
For each service, the lawyers were asked whether they would do the ser-
vice, their fee structures, and the amount of time required to perform
the service. The lawyers were instructed to assume that they had not been
employed by the client before nor were they to assume that they would
serve the client in the future. According to the authors, "[t]he empirical
results ...show that the Phoenix market for routine legal services in 1978
was characterized by astonishing variation in fees charged for four
relatively routine services, suggesting a high degree of consumer ignorance
in the market. 220
According to all three of these studies, the principal motivation
in restricting advertising was to maintain a high degree of profes-
215. Cady, supra note 190.
216. Cox, DeRerpa, & Canby, supra note 194.
217. Both surveys excluded lawyers not in private practice. One-hundred and thirty-seven
lawyers were included in the in-person survey while 134 lawyers were included in the mail sample.
The response rates, 96% and 84% respectively, were more than sufficient to produce statistically
reliable data. The same questions were asked in both surveys. Id. at 311.
218. According to the authors:
One source of attorneys' market power is their informational advantage vis-a-vis
their clients. Another is service heterogeneity. Every attorney is an individual possessing
some unique set of skills. Any given service he renders, therefore, differs theoreti-
cally from that rendered by another attorney. In one segment of the legal services
market, however, service quality is not subject to variation, either across attorneys
or across cases. Such services will be referred to as "routine" legal services.
Id. at 306.
219. Id. at 311.
220. Id. at 317. The economics of advertising offer rival hypotheses concerning the poten-
tial impact on legal service prices. Prices should decline if:
(a) economies of scale are achieved due to increased demand for legal services, thereby
reducing per-unit costs; and
(b) lawyers attempt to create a competitive advantage by promoting prices lower than
their competitors.
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sionalism.22' The effect of the advertising restriction, while superficially
intended to benefit consumers by protecting them from over-
commercialization and professionals motivated by profit, reduced com-
petition and increased prices. With the profession in control of the
marketplace rather than the consumer, resources of society are seriously
misallocated because the profession is allowed to constrain the behavior
of both members and consumers in the desired direction. Clearly, with
regard to those resources, the "alternative is to assume that this in-
formation is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the
best means to that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than to close them. '222
D. Concerns About Deceptive Advertising
The benefits to society from the abolition of advertising prohibitions
and restrictions imposed by professional organizations on their members
are clear.223 The emphasis, however, is on replacing those prohibitions
with truthful, informative advertisements. Unfortunately, the market
system has no fully satisfactory mechanism for separating truthful and
abusive advertising in order to encourage the former and discourage the
latter. Thus, in those situations in which the problems associated with
abusive advertisements are considered by the profession to be grievous
enough to warrant corrective action, much of the burden of assuring
truthful advertising will likely be placed upon the government, or the
relevant professional organization. The government, through the Federal
Trade Commission, is already charged, as a backstop to private action
On the other hand, advertising could lead to higher prices if the costs are not offset by addi-
tional revenue. In a survey of 2,700 Harvard Business Review subscribers, 82% of them business
managers, 49 indicated that they believed that advertising led to higher prices, while 35% believed
it led to lower prices. Greyser & Reece, Businessmen Look Hard at Advertising, 49 HARVARD
BUSINESS REvIEw 26 (1971). Lawyers would have to either adsorb the increased costs or pass
them on to the clients in the form of higher prices. Considerable economic literature exists
on this controversy. See, e.g., CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIsTIC COMPETITION, (6th
ed.) ch. 7 (1950); Demsetz, The Nature of Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competition, 67 JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 21 (1950); Steiner, Marketing Productivity in Consumer Goods Industries,
42 JOURNAL OF MARKETINO 60 (1978). The Court in Bates noted the potential impact on the
cost of legal services:
Although it is true that the effect of advertising on the price of services has not
been demonstrated, there is revealing evidence with regard to products; where con-
sumers have the benefit of price advertising, retail prices are dramatically lower than
they would be without advertising. It is entirely possible that advertising will serve
to reduce, not advance, the cost of legal services to consumer. [footnotes omitted]
Bates, 433 U.S. at 377.
221. See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S., at 368-372.
222. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S., at 770.
223. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
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by the professional organization, with detecting and enjoining misleading
and deceptive advertising practices." 4
However, the job of accurately defining a misleading and deceptive
advertisement a priori will not be an easy one." 5 The line between adver-
tisments that are misleading and those that are merely persuasive is fuzzy
and gray. 226 As such, the imposition of controls establishing a priori what
is and what is not misleading based on less than objective criteria may
be too restrictive, thereby suppressing desirable initiative and creativity.
In addition, considerable difficulties in determining acceptability are likely
to exist when differences in advertising media are considered. Conse-
quently, all such policies intending to curb abuses run the risk of evok-
ing undesirable side effects in the form of market outcomes detrimental
to consumers.
On a more cynical note, it is difficult to be sanguine about the ability
of the government or a professional organization charged with policy
enforcement to "outwit" their business counterparts and ensure that after
individuals and firms have undertaken adaptive steps with regard to that
policy, the situation will be much improved. 2 1 As a consequence, the
best "policeman" may well be the consumer, particularly if the consumer
is able to appeal through the courts for compensation if the service pur-
chased is not performed as advertised. s2  Although consumer policing
will not curb all advertising abuses, nor will a formal agency or organiza-
tion. To their credit, in contrast to the consumers of decades past upon
224. See generally TREBILCOCK, DUGGAN, ROBINSON, WILTON-SIEGEL, & MASSEE, A STUDY
OF CONSUMER MISLEADING AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, Vol. 1, Chapter III (1976); U.S.
HOuSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OVERSIGHT HEARINGS INTO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-
BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION BEFORE THE Comm. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976); Udell & Fischer, The FTC Improvement Act, 41 J. MARKETING 81 (1977);
Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1019-27, 1058-65
(1967).
225. See generally Brandt & Preston, The Federal Trade Commission's Use of Evidence
to Determine Deception, 41 J. MARKETING 54 (1977); Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission
and False Advertising, 64 COL. L. REv. 437 (1964).
226. See generally KINTER, A PRIMR ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES (1971); ALEX-
ANDER, HONESTY AND COMPETITION (1967).
227. Dissatisfaction with government intervention in the marketplace has increased in re-
cent years. See generally Wilson & Rachal, Can the Government Regulate Itself, 46 THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 3 (1977); Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J. BusiNmss 117 (1964);
Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POLITICAL ECONOMY 677 (1975);
Pustay, Regulatory Reform of Motor Freight Carriage in the United States, 10 INT. J. TRANS.
EcON. 259 (1983); PusTAY, DEREGULATING AIR TRANSPORTATION: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE, IN
REASSESSING THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE MIXED ECONOMY, 265-86 (Giersch, ed. 1982);
Ringleb, The Natural Gas Regulatory Dilemma: A Market Solution, Another Complex Com-
promise, or The Staus Quo?, 6 J. ENERGY LAW & POLICY 107 (1985). That dissatisfaction
is, in large part, attributed to disagreements with the economic justifications for regulation
put forth by those calling for regulation, and with the implementation of regulation by state
and federal agencies.
228. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 2d, 271-2 (1977).
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whom advertising prohibitions were initially based, considerable evidence
exists that consumers today are much more sophisticated in their percep-
tions of product and service advertising.2 29 This sophistication, rather
than the efforts of government agencies and professional organizations,
ultimately will cause individuals and firms making exaggerated claims
to lose their credibility and be unable to retain their customers. In this
sense, "[tihe most worthy and effective advertisement possible ... is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. 230
MEASURING THE ACCEPTABILITY AND THE CREDIBILITY
OF LAWYER DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISEMENTS
Despite heavy regulation through the first half of this century231 along
with the strong negative disposition toward advertising that regulation
created and fostered, advertising by the professions has become a reality
in the 1980's with more advertising appearing on a regular basis in vir-
tually all the media. Still, despite recognition by the courts of the societal
benefits flowing from the information provided,232 advertising is still
believed to be damaging to the professions by many of their members.233
Intricately tied up in that belief are lingering questions regarding con-
sumer and professional attitudes toward advertising. A foremost con-
cern among those most opposed to advertising is the effect advertising
will have on professional credibility. 3
In that regard, the marketing profession has undertaken a number of
studies examining the use of advertising by professionals. 2" The princi-
ple research methodology employed in those studies was surveys of the
professional group and potential consumers. Here, two such major
surveys were undertaken. The first survey measured current lawyer and
consumer perceptions and attitudes with regard to advertising generally
229. See supra note 31 and accompany text.
230. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
232. See Bates, 433 U.S. 350; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
233. See supra note I and accompanying text.
234. See Comment, supra note 10, at 399.
235. See Bloom, Advertising in the Professions: The Critical Issues, 41 J. MARKETING 103
(1977); Kotler & Connor, Marketing Professional Services, 41 J. MARKETING 71 (1977); Shapiro
& Majewski, Should Dentists Advertise?, 23 J. ADVERTISING RES. 33 (1983); Shimp & Dyer,
How the Legal Profession Views Legal Services Advertising, 42 J. MARKETING 74 (1978); Smith
& Meyers, Attorney Attitudes Toward Professional Advertising, 1978 AMER. MAR. ASSo. EDUC-
TORS CONFERENCE, AMER. MAR. Asso., CHICAGO, ILL., 288-291 (1978); Dyer & Shimp, Re-
actions to Legal Advertising, 20 J. ADVERTISING RESEARCH 314 (1980); Darden, Darden, &
Kiser, The Marketing of Legal Services, 45 J. MARKETING 123 (1981); Patterson & Swerdlow,
Should Lawyers Advertise? A Study of Consumer Attitudes, 10 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCIENCE
314 (1982).
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and to direct mail advertisements specifically. The second survey measured
the effect of lawyer direct mail advertisements on credibility.236
A. A Survey of Consumer and Lawyer Attitudes Toward Direct
Mail Advertising
The first survey allowed for the measurement of lawyer and consumer
attitudes toward lawyer advertising. Specifically, the intent of the survey
was to determine if significant differences in attitudes exist between
lawyers and consumers regarding lawyer direct mail advertisements. The
lawyer survey began with two general questions regarding lawyer adver-
tising, and then both the consumer and lawyer surveys asked for responses
to a series of "media" and "attitudinal" statements. Both series required
a response according to a seven-point Likert scale23 7 ranging from
"strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." The media statements were con-
cerned with seven forms of advertising media available for use by the
legal profession, and were intended to provide an indication of how direct
mail advertising compared with the other media available. The attitudinal
statements focused solely on attitudes toward advertising by professionals.
The statements principally addressed the issues of the benefits consumers
derive from such advertising.
1. The Sample
A total of 282 respondents participated in the survey to determine con-
sumer and lawyer attitudes toward lawyer direct mail advertising. Of the
282 respondents, 170 were consumers and 112 were practicing lawyers.
The consumer respondents were selected by mailing questionnaires to
a probability sample of 750 households from two major metropolitan
areas, with approximately twenty-three percent or 170 responding.
The lawyer sample was derived from the membership of two bar
associations and a young lawyers association from the same two major
metropolitan areas. Under the belief that younger lawyers may have a
different attitude toward advertising,23 these organizations were chosen
236. The survey results presented here are part of an ongoing research effort on the subject
of lawyer advertising. The results presented do not include the statistical analysis undertaken
to establish their validity. For a more complete presentation in that regard, interested parties
are invited to correspond with the authors directly.
237. See SCHONER & UHL, MARKETING RESEARCH: INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND DECISION
MAKING, 270-71 (1975) (for a more thorough discussion of the Likert method of summated
ratings).
238. In 1980, Dyer and Shimp reported that the results of their study indicated that those
lawyers who intended to advertise were younger and typically in an individual or very small
practice. See Dyer & Shimp, supra note 235. Johansson, Merrill, & Wilson reported a similar
1235
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
in an attempt to ensure that a sufficient number of lawyers working for
both new and well established law firms would be sampled. From the
memberships provided by those organizations, a self-administered ques-
tionnaire was distributed to a sample of 152 lawyers, with 112 ultimate-
ly being completed and returned for a response rate of approximately
seventy-four percent. The lawyer sample had the following "years in prac-
tice" distribution, practices as indicated by the following sample make-up:
5 years 18%
610 years 16%
11-15 years 11%
16-20 years 4%
20 years 51%
2. Lawyer Attitudes Toward Advertising In General
Aside from two specific questions aimed only at the lawyers, and with
the exception of some general classification questions, '39 the consumer
and lawyer questionnaires were identical. The questionnaire sent to the
lawyers began with the general question, should lawyers be "allowed to
advertise under certain circumstances?" The vast majority of lawyers,
nearly eighty percent, responded in the affirmative. This result contrasted
dramatically with a major study undertaken just five years ago that had
reported the opposite finding. 4 °Lawyers were then asked the more specific
question, whether they would consider using direct mail advertisements,
to which eighty percent responded that they would not."'
3. Consumer and Lawyer Attitudes Regarding Advertising Media
As Table 1 indicates, consumer and lawyer attitudes toward the use
of a variety of media for lawyer advertising produced significantly dif-
finding with regard to architects. See Johansson, Merrill, & Wilson, Professionals and Adver-
tising: A Case Study of Architects' Attitudes, 1979 CURRENT ISSUES AND RESEARCH IN ADVER-
TISING 93.
239. Consumers were asked basic demographic questions while lawyers were questioned about
their law practice. An elaborate statistical analysis, called analysis of variance, was employed
to determine if any of the classification variables had affected the responses. There were no
statistically significant differences in responses to the media and attitudinal statements among
lawyers when the sample was classified by areas of specialization, age of the lawyer, or the
number of years in practice. However, differences did arise when the lawyers were subdivided
into those who had advertised in the past and those who had not. No differences of any statistical
consequence were discovered when the consumer sample was reclassified on the basis of age,
education, or income.
240. Shimp & Dyer, supra note 235.
241. Note that although 80% did not intend to use direct mail advertisements in the future,
20% did. This 20% figure, interestingly, is very similar to the percent of lawyers found by
Shimp and Dyer to be in favor of advertising during the late 70's. See Shimp & Dyer, supra
note 235.
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ferent results. For all advertising media considered, lawyers gave
significantly lower approval scores than the consumers. Clearly, lawyers
are much more critical than consumers in their perceptions of advertis-
ing and of advertising media.
Table 1
Comparison of Consumer and Lawyer Attitudes
Toward the Use of Various Advertising Media
Media Mean Approval Scores*
Consumers Lawyers
Yellow Pages 5.15 4.23
Newspaper 3.84 2.62
Magazines 3.30 2.19
Direct Mail 2.62 1.20
Radio 2.43 1.35
Television 2.31 1.20
Billboards 1.79 0.87
*The higher the mean number, the more the respondent approves of the use
of that particular advertising media by lawyers.
Note, however, that while consumer and attorney attitudes toward the
use of various advertising media differed, the relative rankings of those
media alternatives did not differ greatly. Both groups most approved
of advertising in the yellow pages, followed by newspapers and then
magazines. The greatest diversity of opinion between the two groups was
in the perception of direct mail advertising. The lawyers ranked direct
mail advertising near the bottom, while consumers were more receptive
to direct mail advertisements, ranking the category above both radio and
television.
4. Consumer and Lawyer Attitudes Regarding Advertising and
the Use of Direct Mail Advertisements
A summary of the responses to attitudinal statements regarding adver-
tising and the use of direct mail advertisements is presented in Table 2.
Statements 1, 3, 5, and 7 focus on lawyer advertising in general and the
effects advertisement may have on the consumer and the marketplace
for legal services. Those statements were included in an attempt to deter-
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mine how overall attitudes of the lawyer and the consumer sample may
differ regarding advertising in general. As indicated in the table, con-
sumers gave significantly more favorable responses to each of those ques-
tions than did lawyers. In response to statements 1, 3, and 5, consumers
perceived lawyer advertising as both more informative and more pro-
fessional than did lawyers. In addition, the consumers expressed more
agreement than did lawyers with the statement (number 7), "If I need
legal help, I would use advertisements to select a lawyer."
Statements 2, 4, 6, and 8 were intended to elicit consumer and lawyer
attitudes toward direct mail advertising by lawyers. As indicated in Table
2, the attitudes toward such advertising differed significantly. As in the
case of advertising in general, consumers were again much more in favor
of direct mail advertising. Statement 2 specifically addresses the ques-
tion of the approval of advertising by lawyers through the mail. The mean
approval values for the statement indicate that consumers perceive direct
mail advertisements in a much more favorable light than do lawyers.
Question 4 asks the respondents whether they would be influenced in
their choice for a lawyer by a direct mail advertisement. Although the
response is not particularly strong, consumers still responded much more
favorably than did lawyers. Question 6 asked whether the respondent
felt that lawyers lose credibility when they advertise through the mail.
The mean value responses, 3.36 for consumers and 4.05 for lawyers, in-
dicate that lawyers as a group tend to be much more critical of direct
mail advertising and the impact the advertising will have on their pro-
fession than are the prospective customers. Similarly, in response to ques-
tion 8, which inquired whether lawyers should be allowed to advertise
through the mail "since [they already] advertise through newspapers and
television," consumers were nearly twice as favorable as were the lawyers
sampled.
Yet, despite the fact that the two groups differed on fundamental adver-
tising issues, they agreed upon the use of prospective client lists for adver-
tising purposes. Question 9 asked respondents whether "lawyers should
be allowed to get a list of prospective clients from third parties (i.e., doc-
tors, insurance agents, etc.) for the purpose of mailing that person an
advertisement." Not only was the use of such lists viewed very un-
favorably by both groups, the question drew the most unfavorable
response of all the questions in the survey.
5. Implications of the Attitudinal Survey
Several key implications are suggested by the survey. First, clear signifi-
cant differences exist between consumers and lawyers in how each group
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Table 2
Comparison of Consumer and Lawyer Attitudes Toward
The Use of Direct Mail and Other Forms of Advertising
Statement
1. Advertising by lawyers is
beneficial to consumers.
2. I approve of advertising
by lawyers through the mail.
3. I find advertising of
lawyers services informative.
4. A direct mail advertise-
ment would influence my
choice of a lawyer.
5. Lawyers who advertise are
unprofessional and hurt the
image of the legal profession.
6. Lawyers lose credibility
when they advertise through
the mail.
7. If I need legal help, I
would use advertisements to
select a lawyer.
8. Since lawyers advertise
through newspapers and
telelvision, they should also
be allowed to advertise
through the mail.
9. Lawyers should be allowed
to get a list of prospective
clients from third parties
(e.g., doctors, insurance
agents, etc.) for the purpose
of mailing that person an
advertisement.
Extent of Agreement
With Statement
(mean)*
Consumers Lawyers
3.52 2.66
2.47
3.06
1.88
2.79
3.36
1.70
3.12
1.19
1.33
2.19
1.37
3.32
4.05
1.17
1.68
0.79
*The higher the mean number, the more approval the respondent gives to that
particular statement.
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views lawyer advertising. Consumers were much more favorable toward
lawyer advertising than were lawyers. In one particular area, the use by
lawyers of the mailing lists of others such as doctors or insurance agents
in generating new clients through the mail, consumers and lawyers were
in agreement as to offensiveness of that advertising practice.
Second, the survey demonstrates that although lawyers have a
somewhat negative view of lawyer advertising in general, they will accept
the more traditional forms of lawyer advertising such as the yellow pages,
newspapers, and magazines. The traditional forms of advertising would
not offend the integrity of the legal profession. Consumers, on the other
hand, responded favorably to advertising from all media.
Third, the most significant difference of opinion between the two
groups as to advertising media occurred with regard to direct mail adver-
tising. Most consumers felt that lawyers should be allowed to use the
mail, while the lawyers felt that direct mail advertising should not be
used by the profession. Emphasizing the consumer viewpoint,24 2 the need
for information to make an informed, reliable decision,243 the survey
indicates that direct mail advertising should not be ruled out as an adver-
tising medium for lawyers.
B. The Use of Direct Mail Advertisements and the Effect on
Lawyer Credibility
As a matter of tradition, a number of lawyers have been and continue
to be reluctant to advertise because they perceive advertising as beneath
the ethical standards of the profession.24 ' A growing number of lawyers,
however, are interested in advertising, but are concerned that advertis-
ing will diminish the image and credibility of their practice and profes-
sion as perceived by the general public.2"5 The intent of the second survey
was to measure the effect of lawyer direct mail advertising on the
credibility of the profession in order to determine the validity behind
this concern.
The basis for the survey was the reaction of respondents to five dif-
ferent direct mail advertisements. Each respondent was randomly assigned
242. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
243. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
244. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
245. In addition, many lawyers have concerns about the cost-effectiveness of advertising.
See generally Comment, supra note 10, at 402 (citing examples of several law firms that
experienced financial difficulties as a result of large advertising expenditures). However, the
law firm in Koffler experienced a twenty-five dollar return in legal fees for every dollar spent
on direct mail advertising. In re Koffler, 70 A.D.2d 252, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1979).
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one of the advertisements to evaluate. Each advertisement was essen-
tially a letter from a lawyer, including an appropriate letterhead profes-
sionally produced and patterned after the advertisement of issue in
Koffler.2 6 The five advertisements had in common the letterhead, some
general introductory legal information, and information on how to reach
the law firm. The remaining information presented in each letter, and
the basis of the survey, differed as follows:
(1) emphasized general legal services and where to go if such ser-
vices were ever needed by the consumer.
(2) similar to letter (1) except that this letter also offered specific
information on prices.
(3) similar to letter (1) except that this letter also offered informa-
tion on the lawyer's professional experience.
(4) similar to letter (1) except that this letter also offered informa-
tion on the lawyer's area of specialization.
(5) gave the appearance of having been taken from a third party
mailing list. It began with the sentence, "We have been informed of
your job related accident and feel you may need legal advice ...."
The credibility evaluations of these direct mail advertisements were
measured according to eight specific characteristics: trustworthy or un-
trustworthy; competent or incompetent; dignified or undignified;
reliable or unreliable; qualified or unqualified; likeable or unlikeable;
respectable or unrespectable; and successful or unsuccessful. Each item
or characteristic was evaluated according to a seven-point scale, with
7 representing a high perception of credibility and 1 representing a
low level. Credibility of the particular advertisement was measured
by summing the individual evaluations attached to each of eight items
or characteristics. Thus, the maximum possible level of measured
credibility was a 56 and the lowest, 8.247
1. The Sample
The respondents participating in the survey were derived from the same
sources as in the attitudinal survey.2"" A total of 260 respondents, 148
consumers (out of 750) and 112 lawyers (out of 152), ultimately par-
ticipated. Each respondent was randomly assigned one of the five direct
mail advertisements to evaluate.
246. In re Koffler, 70 A.D.2d 252, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1979).
247. This approach was primarily based on a study by Wilding & Bauer. It has been shown
to be reliable and valid in measuring credibility. Wilding & Bauer, Consumer Goals and Re-
actions to a Communication Source, 5 J. MARKETING 73 (1968).
248. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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2. Consumer and Lawyer Perceptions of Credibility
As illustrated in Table 3, consumers and lawyers differ considerably
in their perceptions on credibility. As indicated by the results of the survey,
consumers are not significantly influenced by the information presented
in lawyer direct mail advertisements; the credibility means do not differ
much among the five sample advertisements.249
Table 3
Comparison of Consumer and Lawyer Preceived
Credibility Ratings of Five
Direct Mail Advertisements
Advertisement Related Credibility Mean*
the Following Information:
Consumers Lawyers
(1) General Legal Services 28.8 14.9
(2) Price of Legal Services 28.6 16.5
(3) Lawyer's Experience 28.3 21.7
(4) Lawyer's Specialization 26.5 15.4
(5) Third-Party Mailing 26.8 12.3
Solicitation
*The higher the credibility mean, the higher the perceived credibility of the direct
mail advertisements.
Lawyers, however, perceived differences in the credibility of the five
advertisements.2 1s As Table-3 illustrates, among the lawyers sampled,
a significantly higher credibility rating was attached to the advertisement
outlining the lawyer's experience .2 1 On the other hand, the advertise-
ment indicating that the origin of the advertisement was from a third-
party list was perceived as the least credible among lawyers. As perceived
by lawyers and reflected in their responses, no statistical difference in
credibility was perceived among the other three advertisements. Clear-
249. A one-way analysis of covariance, used to determine if any statistical differences in
credibility amoung the five advertisements, found no such statistical difference.
250. The same one-way analysis of variance test applied to the lawyer sample demonstrated
statistical differences in credibility perceptions.
251. A Duncan's multiple range post hoc test was run to determine statistically where the
difference in credibility occurred.
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ly, the informational content of a lawyer's direct mail advertisement does
have an effect on how lawyers view the credibility of the advertisement.252
3. Implications of the Survey
Several key implications are suggested by this survey. First, as in the
first survey on attitudes, consumers and lawyers differ significantly in
their perceptions of the credibility of lawyer advertising. Consumers were
more accepting of direct mail advertisements, and considerably more
neutral with regard to the informational content of those advertisements.
Clearly, consumers are much less critical of direct mail advertising by
lawyers than are lawyers themselves.
Second, although lawyers did find the advertisements much less credible
than did consumers, they did highly rate the advertisement setting forth
the lawyer's experience. Apparently, lawyers found such an advertise-
ment to be much more professional relative to the other four. On the
other hand, the lawyers were most critical of the letter addressed to a
consumer whose name was derived from a third party.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In 1977, after nearly eighty years of formal prohibitions on lawyer
advertising, the Supreme Court in Bates v. Arizona ruled that such pro-
hibitions violate the lawyer's right of free expression under the first
amendment. In response, most states amended their codes of professional
responsibility to comply with the dictates of that decision. Although the
states did attempt to interpret Bates very narrowly, particularly with
regard to the information being conveyed and the media being employed,
lawyer communications with prospective clients moved quickly beyond
the fact situation presented in Bates in many jurisdictions. The legal pro-
fession in general, however, has remained concerned about the poten-
tially adverse consequences that the trend toward unrestricted advertis-
ing would have on the profession, particularly as those interested in adver-
tising consider the marketing potentials of the electronic media and direct
mail advertising.
252. These results tend to support Sheriffs theory of social judgment. SHERrIT & HOVLAND,
SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1964). As extended and applied in the marketing profession, the theory
of social judgment would propose that if two groups of respondents with different levels of
involvement toward a given subject are exposed to the same message, their perceptions will
differ based on their selective perception processes. Id. The group that is highly involved and
opinionated on the given subject, will accept very few positions and will reject most positions.
Id. The groups with a low level of involvement would conversely, accept more new positions.
Id.*Here, since lawyers are considerably more involved than consumers in the issues surround-
ing lawyer advertising, they will exhibit a much lower willingness to accept new positions.
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Both the economics of and consumer attitudes (as measured by the
surveys presented herein) toward lawyer advertising, however, suggest
that such concerns are unwarranted. The empirical economic evidence
strongly suggests that the effect of restrictions on the public dissemina-
tion of information by the professions leads to increased prices and
reduced competition, hardly market outcomes in the interest of society.
Furthermore, the absence of such information enhances the market power
of established lawyers in a profession in which contacts in the community
are a lawyer's principal source for generating business in the absence
of advertising.
With regard to consumer perceptions of lawyer direct mail advertis-
ing, the surveys indicate that significant differences exist between con-
sumers and lawyers in how each group views lawyer advertising. Con-
sumers were found to be much less critical and much more accepting
of lawyer advertising than were lawyers. The most significant disagree-
ment between the two groups involved their perceptions of direct mail
advertising. While consumers clearly felt that lawyers should be allowed
to use the mails, lawyers were generally opposed. Both groups, however,
were opposed to the use by lawyers of mailing lists obtained from doc-
tors, insurance agents, and other similar parties. Finally, although con-
sumers found the advertising of legal services by lawyers to be infor-
mative, approved of direct mail advertisements, and found advertising
by lawyers to be beneficial, consumers also stated that direct mail adver-
tisements would not influence their choice of a lawyer nor would they
select a lawyer merely on the basis of an advertisement.
In assessing the impact of using direct mail advertisements on the
credibility of a lawyer, the survey results suggest that consumer percep-
tions of a lawyer's credibility are not affected in any meaningful fashion
by the information conveyed in that advertisement. Consumer percep-
tions of the lawyer's credibility differed little between a direct mall adver-
tisement providing general legal services information and another
amounting to little more than a direct solicitation. Clearly, as long as
consumers are not going to be influenced in their choice of a lawyer by
an advertisement, they are not likely to be appreciably moved by the
contents of the advertisement. Interestingly, lawyers, while finding a
lawyer's use of direct mail advertisements much less credible than did
consumers regardless of the information conveyed, did rate highly a direct
mail advertisement conveying the lawyer's professional experience.
Thus, in considering the permissibility of direct mall advertising, the
Court undoubtedly will not uphold a state regulation imposing a blanket
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prohibition.2" On the other hand, the Court is not likely to strike down
a state law prohibiting direct mail advertisements that raise the poten-
tial for a conflict of interest-a restraint on direct mail advertisements
(currently upheld by the state courts) that arguably is well grounded. 25
That exception aside, little rationale appears to exist, at least from the
perspective of consumers, for the Court to uphold a prohibition against
other uses of direct mail advertising by lawyers. As our survey suggests,
consumers find lawyer advertising beneficial, would not be influenced
in their choice of a lawyer by such an advertisement, and, in that regard,
are indifferent as to the informational content of the advertisement. The
available evidence indicates that consumers as a group are much more
sophisticated in their receptivity to advertisements, and as such, are better
able to separate those that are informative from those that are abusive.255
The Court has noted the importance of the free flow of commercial in-
formation in the efficient allocation of resources of society. 256 Thus, to
the extent the use of direct mail advertising by lawyers is dictated by con-
sumer preferences and not by those of the profession, the Court will find
that subject to the restraint noted above, direct mail advertising is an
acceptable means by which lawyers may communicate with their poten-
tial clients.
253. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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